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I. Introduction
Imagine you are a juror in a Virginia capital murder trial.
It has reached the penalty phase of trial, the guilt phase having
concluded with a conviction of first-degree murder. There was
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little question about the defendant’s culpability—he had
confessed to the killing—and a guilty verdict was a relatively
straightforward finding. But now you and your eleven co-jurors
must confront a far graver issue than the question of guilt. It is a
question of life or death: should the defendant spend the rest of
his life behind bars, or face execution?
Arguing for a life sentence, the defense describes the
defendant’s tragic past and reveals the emotional and physical
abuse that the defendant endured throughout his childhood. The
defendant’s mentally ill mother constantly berated the defendant
and his sister, screaming at them things such as “I wish I’d never
had you” and “you’re not worth a shit.” She brutally beat the
defendant whenever she felt like it, once so uncontrollably that
his sister thought their mother was going to kill him. The
defendant’s father, a serial pedophile, routinely sexually
assaulted the defendant’s sister and younger cousins. When the
defendant gained enough courage to defend his sister against one
of their father’s attacks, his father forced him at gunpoint to strip
to his underwear and kicked him out of the house for good. He
was sixteen years old.
On the streets with no one to turn to, the defendant fell
hard into drug and alcohol addiction. With addiction came a life
of crime and impulsive violence—offenses which the defendant
committed only when he was under the influence of drugs,
alcohol, or both. During his consequent incarcerations, when he
had no access to drugs or alcohol, the defendant was a model
prisoner who posed no danger to those around him. After his
release from prison, the defendant repeatedly tried to break free
of his addictions. Each time, however, his unstable environment
and lack of support system stifled his efforts at sobriety. And so
this cycle of addiction, crime, and imprisonment continued,
culminating in the murder for which he is currently on trial.
The prosecution, arguing for a sentence of death,
emphasizes the defendant’s violent past, specifically focusing on
the defendant’s criminal record, history of aggression, and the
circumstances surrounding the murder. Pointing to this
backwards-looking evidence, the prosecutor argues that the
defendant is a very dangerous person. The prosecution stresses
that unless the defendant is executed, he will undoubtedly
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commit future acts of violence.
After both sides have concluded their arguments, the
judge instructs you and your fellow jurors to determine whether
the defendant will receive the death penalty. You will base your
decision in large part upon your assessment of the defendant’s
likelihood of committing future acts of violence “in society.” When
you ask the judge whether “society” means prison society or
society in general, the judge responds that “society” means all of
society.
To you, this does not make sense. You know—because the
judge has told you so—that if the defendant is not put to death,
he will spend the rest of his life behind bars: in Virginia (as in
virtually all death penalty states), “life imprisonment” means life
without possibility of parole. If prison is the only place that the
defendant will ever live, how—and why—would you predict the
defendant’s future acts in free society? Notwithstanding your
confusion, you and your fellow jurors realize that you must make
a decision. You were instructed to determine whether there is a
probability that the defendant would commit future violent acts
in all of society, counter-factual as it may be. Although the
defendant’s painful childhood made you feel sympathetic—and
was certainly pushing you towards a verdict of life in prison—the
defendant’s history of violence speaks for itself. Based on the
judge’s instruction, the decision seems clear. You and the rest of
the jury return a unanimous sentence of death.
The foregoing hypothetical describes the very real murder
trial of Mark Lawlor.1 Lawlor was prosecuted in Fairfax County,
Virginia, for the murder of Genevieve Orange, a tenant in the
apartment complex where Lawlor worked.2 Despite the extreme
brutality of Lawlor’s crime, his defense presented a compelling
argument against the death penalty, describing his horrific
childhood, his severe addiction to drugs and alcohol, and the fact
that the crime was committed after Lawlor had consumed
1. See infra notes 141–62 and accompanying text (discussing Lawlor v.
Commonwealth, 738 S.E.2d 847 (Va. 2013) (No. 120481).
2. See Brief of the Commonwealth at 5, Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 738
S.E.2d 847 (Va. 2013) (No. 120481) (“Lawlor was employed by the Prestwick
Apartments as a leasing agent, and lived in an apartment one floor below Ms.
Orange in a different wing of the same complex.”).
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massive amounts of crack cocaine and alcohol.3 To counter the
prosecution’s claims, the defense offered evidence of Lawlor’s
good behavior during past incarcerations and argued that when
in a structured environment without access to drugs or alcohol,
Lawlor posed little—if any—threat to those around him.4
To support this argument, the defense offered as a witness
Dr. Mark Cunningham, a nationally renowned prison risk
assessment expert who is exceptionally experienced in assessing
capital defendants’ likelihood of committing future violent acts
while imprisoned for life.5 Dr. Cunningham intended to provide
his risk assessment of Mark Lawlor and testify that, based on
specific factors including future context (in other words, prison)
and Lawlor’s individualized characteristics (for example, his
employment history, continued contact with family and friends
while in prison, and past appraisals by correctional officers), he
posed a low risk of future violence while in prison.6
But the jurors never heard this risk assessment evidence.
The trial court excluded virtually all of Dr. Cunningham’s
testimony, citing Supreme Court of Virginia precedent as grounds
for its decision.7 Indeed, the trial court kept out any reference to
“general prison life” conditions based on Virginia case law.8 The
defense could not discuss the fact that serious violent recidivism
3. See Opening Brief for Appellant at 16–17, Lawlor v. Commonwealth,
738 S.E.2d 847 (Va. 2013) (No. 120481) (describing Lawlor’s horrible past and
his intoxication during the commission of the crime).
4. See Brief of the Commonwealth, supra note 2, at 25 (stating that
Lawlor presented witnesses to describe his good behavior in jail).
5. See Homepage, http://www.markdcunningham.com/index.php, MARK D.
CUNNINGHAM, PH.D., ABPP (last visited Sept. 7, 2013) (stating that Mr.
Cunningham is a clinical and forensic psychologist who has provided
“consultation and/or testimony in state or federal litigation in 42 states, the
District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico”) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
6. See Opening Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, at 42 (“The defense
sought to introduce the expert opinion of Dr. Mark Cunningham that, based on
Mr. Lawlor’s particular character, history, and background, he would be a low
risk for violence in prison and would adapt positively to the prison
environment.”).
7. See id. (“[T]he court generally, and emphatically, excluded it because
the testimony focused on Mr. Lawlor’s risk of serious violence in prison.”).
8. See id. at 46 (stating that the trial court relied on Supreme Court of
Virginia precedent as its reason for excluding general prison evidence).
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by all capital murderers, once imprisoned for life, is extremely
rare.9 Nor could the defense give any explanation of exactly how
and why the Virginia prison system is able to minimize the risk
of such violence despite the fact that these prisons are filled with
“dangerous” people.10 Excluding any information about the
overall context of Lawlor’s future life prohibited the jury from
reaching a reliable assessment of the magnitude of the risk posed
by Lawlor, and it all but guaranteed that the jury would greatly
overestimate the risk of future violence.11 This is because the jury
would base its future “risk assessment” only by extrapolating
from the information they did have—especially the extreme
violence displayed by the capital murder itself. Such an ominous
prediction of Lawlor’s future behavior (quite understandably) had
a significant impact on the jurors, one that ultimately produced a
unanimous verdict of death.12
The trial court based its exclusion of the risk assessment
evidence on the Supreme Court of Virginia’s case law interpreting
Virginia’s “future dangerousness”13 statutory aggravating
9. See id. at 33–49 (discussing the trial court’s exclusion of any mention of
general prison information, including prison statistics); see also infra notes 94–
162 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court of Virginia’s precedent
prohibiting general prison information).
10. See Opening Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, at 42 (discussing the
trial court’s exclusion of any mention of general prison information, including
prison conditions that make prison violence less likely); see also infra notes 94–
162 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court of Virginia’s precedent
prohibiting general prison information).
11. See infra notes 51–57 and accompanying text (discussing the likelihood
of juries to overestimate capital defendants’ risk of future violence when they do
not have reliable, accurate risk assessments from which they can predict future
dangerousness).
12. See Opening Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, at 18 (stating that the
jury returned a verdict of death).
13. See Meghan Shapiro, An Overdose of Dangerousness: How “Future
Dangerousness” Catches the Least Culpable Capital Defendants and Undermines
the Rationale for the Executions It Supports, 35 AM. J. CRIM. L. 145, 146 (2008)
(“‘Future dangerousness’ is a very non-technical name for a particularly
problematic sentencing factor used in nearly every capital jurisdiction in the
United States, directly underlying at least half of all modern era executions and
likely playing some role in the rest.” (footnotes omitted)). Wyoming is the only
state to use the term “future dangerousness” in its death penalty statute. See
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(h)(xi) (2012) (“The defendant poses a substantial and
continuing threat of future dangerousness or is likely to commit continued acts
of criminal violence.”). Most statutes refer to the notion of a defendant’s future
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factor.14 This statute provides that
a sentence of death shall not be imposed unless the
court or jury shall (1) after consideration of the past
criminal record of convictions of the defendant, find
that there is a probability that the defendant would
commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing serious threat to society . . .
and (2) recommend that the penalty of death be
imposed.15
Under a normal, commonsense future dangerousness assessment,
the statute would require the jury to “predict[] . . . whether an
individual in the criminal justice system will commit a violent
crime in the future.”16 From its inception, the notion of future
dangerousness as a basis for imposing the death penalty has
caused concern.17 It seems practically impossible for one person to
dangerousness through language referencing the defendant’s likelihood of
future violent acts. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (2012) (“[T]here is a
probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing serious threat to society.”). This Note refers to
this sentencing factor as “future dangerousness” for simplicity’s sake.
14. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 277 (9th ed. 2009) (describing the term
“aggravating circumstance” to mean “[a] fact or situation that increases the
degree of liability or culpability for a criminal act”). The terms “aggravating
circumstance” and “aggravating factor” are used interchangeably. Id. The U.S.
Supreme Court has determined that a state “must channel the sentencer’s
discretion by ‘clear and objective standards’ that provide ‘specific and detailed
guidance,’ and that ‘make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a
sentence of death’” when it authorizes the death penalty. Godfrey v. Georgia,
446 U.S. 420, 428 (1980) (plurality opinion) (citations omitted). In order to
channel the sentencer’s discretion pursuant to constitutional standards, “the
trier of fact must convict the defendant of murder and find one ‘aggravating
circumstance’ (or its equivalent) at either the guilt or penalty phase.” Tuilaepa
v. California, 512 U.S. 967, 972 (1994). Thus, “statutory aggravating
circumstances play a constitutionally necessary function at the stage of
legislative definition: they circumscribe the class of persons eligible for the
death penalty.” Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 878 (1983).
15. VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (2013).
16. Brian Sites, The Danger of Future Dangerousness in Death Penalty Use,
34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 959, 960–61 (2007) (“Future dangerousness is ultimately a
yes-or-no decision, . . . ‘maybe’ is not an option.”).
17. See Eric F. Citron, Note, Sudden Death: The Legislative History of
Future Dangerousness and the Texas Death Penalty, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
143, 154 n.56 (2006) (“There have been literally hundreds of scholarly articles
written on the problems of the future dangerousness standard, many originating
in the law-and-psychology community.”).
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accurately predict another person’s future actions.18 Nonetheless,
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the future
dangerousness aggravating factor long ago, and the factor has
become prominent in many states’ capital sentencing schemes.19
Virginia has a particularly long and complicated history
with the future dangerousness aggravating factor. Unlike all
other jurisdictions, Virginia does not interpret “future
dangerousness” to mean an assessment of the defendant’s likely
future behavior. Rather, the Supreme Court of Virginia has
redefined the aggravating factor as a somewhat abstract
evaluation of whether the defendant has “a mental inclination
towards violence.”20 To perform this evaluation, the trier of fact is
only allowed to consider evidence of the defendant’s past criminal
record and history, and the circumstances surrounding the
offense.21 Accordingly, all other evidence—including general
prison evidence—is irrelevant to the future dangerousness
analysis. This atypical interpretation of the future dangerousness
aggravating factor has significant implications for the way
Virginia capital sentencing hearings are conducted, and raises
serious issues of fundamental fairness for Virginia capital
defendants like Mark Lawlor.22
This Note explores Virginia’s redefinition of the future
dangerousness statutory aggravating factor and considers the
constitutional implications that flow from it. Part II discusses the
constitutionality of the future dangerousness statutory
aggravating factor and the U.S. Supreme Court’s assessment of
what a future dangerousness inquiry requires. Part III analyzes
18. See Jonathan R. Sorensen & Rocky L. Pilgrim, An Actuarial Risk
Assessment of Violence Posed by Capital Murder Defendants, 90 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1251, 1254 (2000) (“Sentencing a defendant to death because of
some act he may commit in the future is troubling for those opposed to such
teleological forecasting and seems to contradict the ‘innocent until proven guilty’
premise of the American judicial system.”).
19. See infra notes 19–29 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme
Court’s approval of future dangerousness and the states that have codified
future dangerousness).
20. See infra notes 169–72 and accompanying text (discussing Virginia’s
interpretation of future dangerousness).
21. See infra notes 169–72 and accompanying text (discussing Virginia’s
interpretation of future dangerousness).
22. See infra Part V.
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the role that future dangerousness predictions play in capital
sentencing proceedings. Part IV surveys the Supreme Court of
Virginia’s capital decisions concerning the issue of future
dangerousness and prison violence risk assessments. Part V
outlines the implications of the Virginia court’s decisions and the
constitutional concerns that are raised. Finally, Part VI concludes
that the current interpretation of Virginia’s future dangerousness
statutory aggravating factor cannot withstand constitutional
scrutiny and argues that substantial changes are needed to the
Commonwealth’s capital sentencing structure.
II. Future Dangerousness as a Constitutionally Acceptable
Aggravating Factor
In 1973, Texas became the first state to incorporate the
concept of future dangerousness into its capital sentencing
structure.23 The state’s death penalty statute required the capital
sentencing jury to determine “whether there is a probability that
the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing threat to society.”24 If the jury answered
in the affirmative—if it found that there was a probability of
future dangerousness—the defendant was all but guaranteed a
death sentence.25 But the statute failed to include any guidance
23. See Shapiro, supra note 13, at 148 (“Future dangerousness was born in
the 63rd Texas legislature, which incorporated it in its 1973 scramble to
reinstate the death penalty after Furman v. Georgia.” (footnote omitted)).
24. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 269 (1976) (quoting TEX. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(b)(2) (West 1973)). The future dangerousness
question is currently written exactly the same as it was in 1973. See TEX. CODE
CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071 § 2(b)(1) (West 2013) (providing Texas’s current
future dangerousness question).
25. See Citron, supra note 17, at 155 (explaining that, although the Texas
statute required affirmative answers to three “special questions” in order to
sentence the defendant to death, “only the ‘future dangerousness’ question
provided any real chance of escape from the ultimate sanction”). The other two
special questions—“[w]hether the conduct of the defendant that caused the
death of the deceased was committed deliberately and with the reasonable
expectation that the death of the deceased or another would result” and
“whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the deceased was unreasonable
in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased”—were of no real
significance by the time the jury reached the sentencing phase in a capital trial.
Id. “Clearly, a verdict of murder with malice aforethought would be unlikely—
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as to what this future dangerousness inquiry entailed, leaving
every operative word undefined.26 A challenge to the statute’s
undefined language resulted in the U.S. Supreme Court’s seminal
decision in Jurek v. Texas.27
The defendant in Jurek alleged that Texas’s future
dangerousness statutory question led to the arbitrary infliction of
the death penalty because it was impossible for a jury to
accurately predict future behavior.28 In a short, ten-sentence
paragraph, the Court addressed this claim and determined that a
jury’s future dangerousness inquiry does not necessarily lead to a
capricious application of the death penalty.29 While the Court
acknowledged that it is “not easy to predict future behavior,” the
Court nonetheless found that it was not an impossible
determination to make.30 In support of its assertion, the Court
pointed to other areas of the criminal justice system—such as the
bail and parole processes—that require a future dangerousness
examination.31 The Court determined that “[t]he task that a
Texas jury must perform in answering the statutory question in
issue is thus basically no different from the task performed
capital case or not—if the jury believed that the murder was not unreasonable
in light of some provocation, or not even committed deliberately.” Id.
Consequently, the jury would inevitably answer the two questions in the
affirmative, leaving open only the question of future dangerousness. Id. at 155–
56.
26. See Shapiro, supra note 13, at 150 n.18 (explaining that, although the
Texas statute leaves undefined “probability,” “criminal acts of violence,” and
“continuing threat to society,” courts have repeatedly held that the terms are
not impermissibly vague); see also Citron, supra note 17, at 158 (“[N]ot only is
[the Texas death penalty statute] ambiguous as to the frame of reference for the
future dangerousness prediction, it also offers absolutely no guidance as to the
level of certainty required for an answer of ‘yes.’”).
27. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976) (plurality opinion).
28. Id. at 274 (“[T]he petitioner argues that it is impossible to predict
future behavior and that the question is so vague as to be meaningless.”).
29. See id. at 275–76 (discussing the future dangerousness inquiry and
upholding Texas’s death penalty statute).
30. See id. at 274–75 (“It is, of course, not easy to predict future behavior.
The fact that such a determination is difficult, however, does not mean that it
cannot be made.”).
31. See id. at 275 (discussing the other areas of the justice system in which
future dangerousness predictions must be made). The Court noted that “any
sentencing authority must predict a convicted person’s probable future conduct
when it engages in the process of determining what punishment to impose.” Id.
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countless times each day throughout the American system of
criminal justice.”32 The Court thus concluded that the Texas
statute was constitutional as written.33
Following the Court’s approval of the dangerousness
statutory language in Jurek, five states—Oregon, Oklahoma,
Wyoming, Idaho, and Virginia—enacted new death penalty
statutes that codified some form of a future dangerousness
requirement.34 And similar to Texas’s statutory scheme, these
newly enacted death penalty statutes left most, if not all, of the
statutory language undefined.35 Although the terms in the future
dangerousness statutes were left open to interpretation, it was
clear that these statutes, including Texas’s, were passed with the
assumption that juries would interpret future dangerousness
statutory language according to its “common meaning.”36 That is,
32. Id. at 275–76.
33. See id. at 276 (finding the Texas capital sentencing scheme
constitutional).
34. See Shapiro, supra note 13, at 146 n.2 (noting the enactment of death
penalty statutes in these states following Jurek). Oregon’s future dangerousness
statute is identical to Texas’s statute. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 163.150(1)(b)(B)
(2013) (asking the sentencer whether “there is a probability that the defendant
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat
to society”). Oklahoma’s future dangerousness aggravating factor requires a
finding that there exists “a probability that the defendant would commit
criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.”
OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.12(7) (2013). Wyoming requires a determination that
the defendant “poses a substantial and continuing threat of future
dangerousness or is likely to commit continued acts of criminal violence.” WYO.
STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(h)(xi) (2012). Idaho’s future dangerousness aggravating
factor requires a finding that “[t]he defendant, by his conduct, whether such
conduct was before, during or after the commission of the murder at hand, has
exhibited a propensity to commit murder which will probably constitute a
continuing threat to society.” IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515(9)(i) (2013). And
Virginia requires a finding that “there is a probability that the defendant would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious
threat to society.” VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-264.2, 264.4(c) (2013).
35. See Shapiro, supra note 13, at 149–50 (“The statutes are notoriously
undefined; Texas, Oklahoma[,] and Virginia, for example, leave every operative
word undefined.”). Idaho is the only state that provides a definition for its future
dangerousness aggravating factor, construing its “propensity” requirement to
denote that a person “is a willing, predisposed killer who tends toward
destroying the life of another, one who kills with less than normal amount of
provocation.” State v. Creech, 670 P.2d 463, 472 (Idaho 1983). The court
determined that “propensity assumes a proclivity, a susceptibility, and even an
affinity toward committing the act of murder.” Id.
36. King v. State, 553 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (“Where
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when engaging in a future dangerousness assessment, the jury
would “predict [the defendant’s] future behavior.”37
With this commonsense understanding that “future
dangerousness” requires a forward-looking assessment into the
capital defendant’s likely future behavior, it becomes necessary to
determine how the jury actually goes about the process of making
such a prediction. What factors come into play when making such
a prediction? How exactly does the process work? The next
section discusses what evidence prosecutors and capital
defendants proffer in their attempts at proving or disproving
future dangerousness to the jury.
III. Prison Violence Risk Assessment
Pursuant to the commonsense understanding of “future
dangerousness,” a future dangerousness assessment under a
state’s death penalty statute requires the jury to evaluate a
capital defendant’s likely future behavior. Both sides present
evidence tending to show a defendant’s probability of committing
dangerous acts in the future, often through future dangerousness
experts. These experts purport to engage in “risk assessments,”38
terms used are words simple in themselves, and are used in their ordinary
meaning, jurors are supposed to know such common meaning and terms and
under such circumstances such common words are not necessarily to be defined
in the charge to the jury.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). The
court in King determined that the future dangerousness statute was
constitutional, noting that in Jurek, “the Supreme Court of the United States
concluded that the submission of the issues provided by [the death penalty
statute] . . . constitutionally guided the jury’s determination of the punishment
issues. No special definitions of the terms of that statute were required.” Id.
37. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274 (1976). Texas, Oklahoma, and
Virginia all relied on the Jurek Court’s interpretation of the future
dangerousness language in upholding their future dangerousness statutes. See
infra notes 80–89 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court of
Virginia’s reliance on Jurek when interpreting Virginia’s future dangerousness
statutory aggravating factor).
38. See Jessica M. Tanner, “Continuing Threat” To Whom?: Risk
Assessment in Virginia Capital Sentencing Hearings, 17 CAP. DEF. J. 381, 382–
83 (2005) (“The process of . . . determining the likelihood of future violent
behavior is what social scientists term ‘risk assessment.’”); Sites, supra note 16,
at 961
A “risk assessment” involves the use of clinical, actuarial, or
physiological methods to determine the probability that an individual
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but the methods and data used in the different risk
assessments lead to very different—and not always reliable—
results.
A. The Prosecution’s Methods of Predicting Future
Dangerousness
In an attempt to convince the jury that the defendant will
likely pose a future danger to society, the prosecution often
utilizes “experts” to offer a prediction of future
dangerousness.39 Using unscientific data in their risk
assessments,40 these mental health professionals grossly
overestimate the degree of risk created by capital defendants. 41
Their calculation of dangerousness—relying on subjective
clinical assessments of the defendant42 as well as other
will commit a violent crime in the future. Risk assessments return a
percentage chance that a given defendant will commit a violent crime
in the future. They are thus somewhat analogous to when weather
forecasts give a percentage chance that certain weather will occur in
the future.
39. See Shapiro, supra note 13, at 159 (describing the prosecution “experts”
as illegitimate “dangerousness diagnosticians”).
40. See Mark D. Cunningham & Jon R. Sorensen, Improbable Predictions
at Capital Sentencing: Contrasting Prison Violence Outcomes, 38 J. AM. ACAD.
PSYCHIATRY LAW 61, 62 (2010) (describing the analyses used by these “experts”).
The prosecution’s “experts” often rely on “the abhorrence of the capital murder
offense, the callousness of the defendant, the defendant’s prior community
misconduct, and the repugnant personality features giving rise to aberrant
behavior.” Id. Such clinical/intuitive risk analyses lead to “grave risk of future
violence in all contexts, including prison.” Id.
41. See Mark D. Cunningham & Thomas J. Reidy, Integrating Base Rate
Data in Violence Risk Assessments at Capital Sentencing, 16 BEHAV. SCI. & L.
71, 71–72 (1998) (“Consistent with well established clinical proclivities to overpredict violence, . . . the most notorious mental health expert testimony at
capital sentencing has grossly overstated the magnitude of risk.”); Cunningham
& Sorensen, supra note 40, at 63 (“If ‘threat to society’ contemplated misconduct
of sufficient severity that a preventative intervention of death seemed
proportional (e.g., something more than a mutual fistfight or minor assault),
these expert predictions had a staggering error rate.”); Shapiro, supra note 13,
at 161–62 (“Mental health professionals themselves are entirely skeptical of
their own predictions, [and] academics appear to have unanimously accepted
that such professionals are unreliable . . . .” (footnotes omitted)).
42. See Tanner, supra note 38, at 397 (“[M]ental health experts have
typically . . . rel[ied] primarily on subjective clinical assessments centered
around the individual client interview. Based upon that interview, a review of
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“common sense” factors43—is often made “to an unqualifiedly
high degree of certainty.”44 But the fact is that these unempirical
“psychiatric predictions of long-term future dangerousness are
wrong in at least two out of every three cases.”45 Such inaccurate
predictions of future dangerousness led the American Psychiatric
Association (APA) to conclude long ago that these “expert”
opinions should not be presented in capital sentencing
proceedings.46
Despite the shocking overestimations by these mental health
professionals, the Supreme Court put its stamp of approval on
the admissibility of this type of expert testimony in Barefoot v.
the client’s file and record, a comparison to similar cases, and a literature
review, a professional evaluator derives an estimate of risk.”).
43. Mark D. Cunningham, Thomas J. Reidy, & Jon R. Sorensen, Assertions
of “Future Dangerousness” at Federal Capital Sentencing: Rates and Correlates
of Subsequent Prison Misconduct and Violence, 32 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 46, 50
(2008) (describing “common sense” factors such as the “defendant’s history of
criminal acts in the community, including features of the capital offense;
assertions of lack of remorse; and/or the defendant’s associated violent-prone
disposition”).
44. Shapiro, supra note 13, at 159. Take, for instance, the infamous Dr.
James P. Grigson, otherwise known as “Dr. Death.” By 1994, “Dr. Grigson had
appeared in at least 150 capital trials on behalf of the state, and his predictions
of future dangerousness had been used to help convict at least one-third of all
Texas death row inmates.” Eugenia T. La Fontaine, Note, A Dangerous
Preoccupation With Future Danger: Why Expert Predictions of Future
Dangerousness in Capital Cases are Unconstitutional, 44 B.C. L. REV. 207, 208
(2002). Dr. Grigson often testified that he was one hundred percent certain that
the defendant would be dangerous in the future, and in some cases he offered
testimony that there was “a one thousand percent chance” that the defendant
would be a future danger. Id. at 209. Even though Dr. Grigson was eventually
expelled from the American Psychiatric Association (APA) and from the Texas
Society of Psychiatric Physicians (TSPP), his testimony sealed the fate for
countless capital defendants. Id. at 210.
45. Shapiro, supra note 13, at 161 (emphasis added) (quoting Brief Amicus
Curiae of the Am. Psychiatric Ass’n for Petitioner at 14, Barefoot v. Estelle, 463
U.S. 880 (1983) (No. 82-6080)).
46. See id.
[B]y 1983 the American Psychiatric Association had reached the firm
conclusion that[] “[p]sychiatrists should not be permitted to offer a
prediction concerning the long-term future dangerousness in a capital
case, at least in those circumstances where the psychiatrist purports
to be testifying as a medical expert possessing predictive expertise in
this area. . . . Medical knowledge has simply not advanced to the
point where long-term predictions—the type of testimony at issue in
this case—may be made with even reasonable accuracy.”
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Estelle.47 The Court did not dispute the APA’s assertion that the
testimony was unreliable.48 Rather, it reasoned that the
adversarial process would filter the reliable testimony from the
Through
effective
cross-examination
and
unreliable.49
presentation of his own expert, the Court determined that the
capital defendant has ample opportunity to counter the
prosecution’s expert’s claims of dangerousness.50 As one might
expect, these unfounded overestimations of future dangerousness
have a significant influence on a sentencing jury despite capital
defendants’ attempts to dispute these grave predictions.
B. The Jury’s Tendency to Overpredict
When conducting future dangerousness assessments, juries
tend to overestimate severely the threat of violence posed by a
capital defendant.51 A number of factors play a role in the jury’s
47. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880 (1982). The prosecution’s psychiatrist
in Barefoot, the notorious Dr. Grigson, testified that “whether Barefoot was in
society at large or in a prison society there was a ‘one hundred percent and
absolute’ chance that Barefoot would commit future acts of criminal violence
that would constitute a continuing threat to society.” Id. at 919 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting).
48. See id. at 896–902 (majority opinion) (acknowledging that errors in
expert predictions may occur); see also id. at 920 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(“The APA’s best estimate is that two out of three predictions of long-term future
violence made by psychiatrists are wrong. . . . The Court does not dispute this
proposition, . . . and indeed it could not do so; the evidence is overwhelming.”).
49. See id. at 901 (majority opinion) (“We are unconvinced, however, at
least as of now, that the adversary process cannot be trusted to sort out the
reliable from the unreliable evidence and opinion about future dangerousness,
particularly when the convicted felon has the opportunity to present his own
side of the case.”).
50. See id. at 898 (“Psychiatric testimony predicting dangerousness may be
countered not only as erroneous in a particular case but as generally so
unreliable that it should be ignored.”).
51. See, e.g., Sorensen & Pilgrim, supra note 18, at 1268–70 (discussing a
study conducted with former capital jurors in Texas that showed the jurors’
extreme overestimation of future dangerousness). Jurors in the study were
asked to estimate the probability that capital defendants would recidivate in the
future if sentenced to life in prison. Id. at 1269. The median estimate of a given
capital defendant’s committing another murder was 50%, compared to the
actual observed frequency of such repeat murders by life-imprisoned inmates to
be 0.2%. Id. In another study, a review of prison disciplinary records of a sample
of future-danger-predicted, formerly death-sentenced inmates in Texas was
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overestimation,52 and the prosecution’s “expert” testimony
declaring a probability that the defendant will strike again if not
put to death is particularly influential.53 Such a grim forecast,
confidently made by someone who appears to be a preeminent
specialist in the field of future-dangerousness prediction, is
understandably persuasive in the eyes of an impressionable
jury.54
Because a “lack of objective information regarding the
likelihood of repeat violence” is a critical component of jury overconducted following the inmates transfer to the general prison population. See
Mark D. Cunningham, Dangerousness and Death: A Nexus in Search of Science
and Reason, 61 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 828, 834 (2006). This study revealed that if
capital juries had been contemplating serious institutional violence (e.g.
aggravated assaults with a weapon) when predicting a capital defendant’s
future dangerousness, the juries were wrong 90% of the time. Id. If the juries
were contemplating a homicide, they were wrong 99% of the time. Id. As Dr.
Cunningham states, “[p]redictions of future violent conduct are subject to
multiple faulty conceptual strategies. . . . The result of these faulty decisionmaking processes is more often an overestimation of violence risk.” Id. at 833–
34.
52. See Cunningham, supra note 51, at 834 (discussing flawed strategies
employed by unaided lay individuals when making violence risk assessment
judgments based on intuition and common sense). Dr. Cunningham states that
faulty conceptual strategies employed by uninformed lay persons include:
(a) not accurately distinguishing between actual violence risk
variables and those intuitively believed to be predictive but that are
not (i.e., illusory correlation); (b) not incorporating all of the available
data and thus emphasizing variables that are most memorable or
most consistent with personal bias, which results in faulty weighting
(i.e., an inability to optimally weight the variables); (c) having a lack
of knowledge of base rate data regarding violence incidence among
similar individuals in the predicted context; (d) ignoring base rates in
the face of specific information or when confronted with a specific
individual; (e) relying on personal experience based on a narrow and
skewed portion of the population under consideration; (f) having
minimal or absent information on the accuracy of predictions; and
(g) showing inflated confidence in the accuracy of judgment.
Id.
53. See Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 41, at 72 (“There is a real danger
that a jury may be inappropriately and significantly influenced by poorly
grounded predictions of future violence offered with great confidence, even when
the prediction is based on intuition rather than solid scientific evidence.”).
54. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 916 (1983) (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (“In a capital case, the specious testimony of a psychiatrist, colored
in the eyes of an impressionable jury by the inevitable untouchability of a
medical specialist’s words, equates with death itself.”).
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prediction,55 defendants attempt to offer their own future
dangerousness experts to counter those opinions presented by the
prosecution. But even when defense expert testimony is
permitted,56 it is unlikely to be as persuasive to the jury as
prosecution expert testimony.57 Nevertheless, capital defendants
advocate for the admission of their own future dangerousness
experts as a means of countering the prosecution’s unscientific
predictions of the defendants’ likely future behavior.
C. The Defense’s Methods of Predicting Future Dangerousness
Importantly, prison is the only relevant context for capital
risk assessments because it is the sole alternative to the death
penalty for a convicted capital defendant in every jurisdiction.58
Although it is commonly believed that prison inmate violence
among murderers is high,59 the reality is that “[m]ost capital
defendants do not engage in serious violence in prison.”60 The
jury would never know of this fact by means of the prosecution’s
“expert” testimony alone, however, because such testimony does
not discuss the context into which a convicted capital defendant
will spend the rest of his life if spared the death penalty. Instead,
prosecution experts merely assert generalized claims that the
55. See Sorensen & Pilgrim, supra note 18, at 1254 (“Several factors in the
decision-making process encourage jurors to overestimate the threat of violence
posed by capital murderers. Foremost among these is the lack of objective
information regarding the likelihood of repeat violence.”).
56. See infra notes 165–75 and accompanying text (discussing Virginia’s
exclusion of defense risk assessment experts).
57. See Shapiro, supra note 13, at 164 (“Jurors are far more likely to have
negative opinions of opposing defense experts, and to see them as ‘hired guns,’
than they will of State experts.” (footnotes omitted)).
58. See Cunningham & Sorensen, supra note 40, at 62 (“The adoption of life
without parole as an alternative sentencing option in all 37 American
jurisdictions utilizing the death penalty has rendered prison the only relevant
predictive context for capital risk assessments.”). For a discussion of Virginia’s
abolition of parole for capital offenders, see infra notes 90–93 and accompanying
text.
59. See Shapiro, supra note 13, at 158 (explaining that without objective
factual information on which to base a future dangerousness prediction, juries
“can (and apparently do) fear that failing to impose a death sentence could lead
to high levels of in-prison violence . . . ”).
60. Cunningham & Sorensen, supra note 40, at 62.
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capital defendant is “dangerous.”61 Consequently, capital
defendants proffer prison violence risk assessments that take into
account the low levels of prison violence to demonstrate that, if
given a life sentence, the defendant would have a statistically
based improbability of committing future dangerous acts.62
The risk assessments proffered by capital defendants employ
“base rate-driven and context-specific methodology.”63 A base rate
is “the statistical prevalence of a particular behavior in a given
group over a set period of time”64 and is “the most important
single piece of information necessary to make an accurate [future
dangerousness] prediction.”65 In conducting one of these base
rate-focused risk assessments, the expert first establishes “with
what frequency capital offenders are violent in a particular prison
environment.”66 The expert then adjusts the resulting
percentage—the base rate—for specific context, including the
level of prison security or isolation.67 This adjustment for context
is a vital part of assessing the likelihood of future violence
because “base rates may vary depending on the setting or
context.”68 Finally, with the base rate as an anchor, the expert
individualizes the risk assessment by examining the defendant’s
“history, behavior pattern, and disposition” and formulates a
scientifically based prediction of that defendant’s likelihood to
commit future violent acts.69
As previously stated, the prevalence of serious prison
violence is very low. The yearly rate of repeat murder in prison
61. See supra notes 39–50 and accompanying text (discussing the
prosecution’s “experts” and the data on which they rely to make future
dangerousness predictions).
62. See Cunningham & Sorensen, supra note 40, at 63 (“Expert testimony
asserting such statistically based improbability, when it appears at capital
sentencing, is invariably sponsored by the defense.” (footnotes omitted)).
63. Id. at 62.
64. Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 41, at 73.
65. JOHN D. MONAHAN, PREDICTING VIOLENT BEHAVIOR: AN ASSESSMENT OF
CLINICAL TECHNIQUES 60 (1981).
66. Tanner, supra note 38, at 387.
67. See id. (discussing the risk assessment process).
68. Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 41, at 75.
69. See id. at 87 (stating that once the base rate is determined, “[i]t is at
this juncture that a defendant’s history, behavior pattern, and disposition
become relevant in individualizing the risk assessment”).
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has been found to be less than one percent for murderers in
general.70 “Studies of capital murderers determined the base
rates of violent rule infractions to be .06 per year or less,”71 and
when “capital risk assessments for prison are anchored to these
base rates, highly reliable estimates of an improbability of future
serious violence result.”72 Conversely, “[w]hen prison risk
estimates fundamentally deviate from or ignore these base rates,
errors abound.”73 Unlike risk assessments that incorporate prison
violence base rates (the defense’s risk assessments), risk
assessments that use only unscientific, “common sense” data (the
prosecution’s risk assessments) are not reliable evaluations of
that defendant’s likelihood to commit violence acts in the future.74
Capital defendants recognize the importance of introducing
base rate-focused risk assessments to the jury in order to counter
intuition-based, unreliable risk assessments offered by the
prosecution. Defendants maintain that, pursuant to Supreme
Court jurisprudence, their proffered risk assessments are
constitutionally required as both rebuttal and mitigating
evidence.75 Nevertheless, Virginia consistently denies capital
defendants the opportunity to introduce these scientifically based
risk assessments, violating fundamental constitutional mandates
and departing from widespread acceptance of this evidence in
other jurisdictions.

70. See Sorensen & Pilgrim, supra note 18, at 1256 (“The yearly rate of
repeat murder in prison has been found to be .002 or less for murderers in
general.”). The repeat murder rate is about .002 for murderers commuted from
death sentences to life in prison sentences. Id. And “[t]his rate is consistent in
situations where capital murderers serving life without parole and capital
murderers serving death sentences were placed in the general prisoner
population.” Id.
71. Id.
72. Cunningham & Sorensen, supra note 40, at 71.
73. Id.
74. See Cunningham, supra note 51, at 832 (“Past community violence is
not strongly or consistently associated with prison violence; current offense,
prior convictions, and escape history are only weakly associated with prison
misconduct; and the severity of the offense is not a good predictor of prison
adjustment.”).
75. See infra notes 118–62 and accompanying text (discussing the
arguments put forth by Virginia capital defendants why such risk assessments
should be admitted in Virginia capital sentencing proceedings).
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IV. Future Dangerousness and Risk Assessment in Virginia
Capital Cases
Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Jurek,76 Virginia
followed Texas’s lead and enacted a new capital punishment
statute that incorporated a future dangerousness statutory
aggravating factor.77 The Commonwealth’s statutory scheme
provides that a capital defendant is eligible for the death penalty
only if the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt the
presence of at least one of two statutory aggravating factors: a
finding of future dangerousness or a finding that the crime was
outrageously or wantonly vile.78 The future dangerousness
76. See supra notes 23–33 and accompanying text (discussing Jurek).
77. See Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135, 146 (Va. 1978) (stating
that the Virginia General Assembly enacted the Commonwealth’s modern death
penalty statutes in 1977 following the pattern approved in Jurek); see also Jason
J. Solomon, Future Dangerousness: Issues and Analysis, 12 CAP. DEF. J. 55, 58
(1999) (“After Jurek, Virginia passed death penalty statutes that included
language similar to that approved in Jurek. Included in these statutes was the
future dangerousness inquiry.”).
78. See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-264.2, 19.2-264.4(C) (2013) (providing
Virginia’s capital punishment statutory scheme). Two statutes comprise the
Commonwealth’s death penalty scheme: Section 19.2-264.2 and Section 19.2264.4(C) of the Virginia Code. Section 19.2-264.2 dictates the conditions for the
imposition of the death penalty, and states:
In assessing the penalty of any person convicted of an offense for
which the death penalty may be imposed, a sentence of death shall
not be imposed unless the court or jury shall (1) after consideration of
the past criminal record of convictions of the defendant, find that
there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts
of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society
or that his conduct in committing the offense for which he stands
charged was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman in
that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery to
the victim; and (2) recommend that the penalty of death be imposed.
Id. § 19.2-264.2. Section 19.2-264.4(C) dictates the sentencing proceeding in a
capital case, and states:
The penalty of death shall not be imposed unless the Commonwealth
shall prove beyond a reasonable doubt that there is a probability
based upon evidence of the prior history of the defendant or of the
circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense of which he
is accused that he would commit criminal acts of violence that would
constitute a continuing serious threat to society, or that his conduct
in committing the offense was outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible
or inhuman, in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or
aggravated battery to the victim.

VIRGINIA’S REDEFINITION

1907

statutory aggravating factor was originally determined to require
the jury to assess whether the defendant displays a probability of
committing future criminal acts.79 As this section discusses, the
Supreme Court of Virginia’s interpretation of this statutory
aggravating factor has, over time, diverged from the
commonsense understanding of “future dangerousness,” and
Virginia’s death penalty statute is now construed in such a way
to completely bar from admission defense-sponsored, base ratefocused risk assessment evidence.
A. In the Beginning: Smith v. Commonwealth80
The first case to challenge Virginia’s new death penalty
statutory scheme came in Smith v. Commonwealth. The
petitioner in Smith brought a claim similar to the one brought in
Jurek—that is, the petitioner argued that the statutory
definitions of the two aggravating circumstances were so vague
as to be unconstitutional.81 The Supreme Court of Virginia
rejected Smith’s future dangerousness argument, quoting a
majority of the Jurek opinion as support for its decision.82 Similar
to the Jurek Court’s reasoning, the Smith court noted that
although predicting future dangerousness is not easy, “prediction
of future criminal conduct is an essential element in many of the
decisions rendered throughout our criminal justice system.”83
Id. § 19.2-264.4(C). Virginia’s second aggravating factor—that the defendant’s
conduct in committing the crime was “outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible or
inhuman, in that it involved torture, depravity of mind or an aggravated battery
to the victim,” id. § 19.2-264.2, is not discussed in this Note.
79. See infra notes 80–89 (discussing the Supreme Court of Virginia’s
original interpretation of the future dangerousness statutory aggravating
factor).
80. Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135 (Va. 1978), cert. denied, 441
U.S. 967 (1979).
81. See id. at 148 (stating Smith’s claim that the statutory definitions are
unconstitutional because they “vest the sentencing authority with standardless
sentencing power”).
82. See Solomon, supra note 77, at 58 (“The [Virginia] court looked to the
United States Supreme Court’s decision in Jurek and quoted nearly all of the
Jurek opinion relating to future dangerousness.”).
83. Smith, 248 S.E.2d at 148 (quoting Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 275
(1976)).
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The Virginia court noted that there is no constitutional error
when the jury bases its prediction of future dangerousness on the
defendant’s prior criminal history, stating that
[i]f the defendant has been previously convicted of “criminal
acts of violence,” i.e., serious crimes against the person
committed by intentional acts of unprovoked violence, there is
a reasonable “probability,” i.e., a likelihood substantially
greater than a mere possibility, that he would commit similar
crimes in the future. Such a probability fairly supports the
conclusion that society would be faced with a “continuing
serious threat.”84

In a footnote to this discussion, the court mentioned a secondary
statutory predicate upon which the jury may base its prediction
of future dangerousness: the circumstances surrounding the
offense.85 Virginia’s highest court determined that the statute
sufficiently guided the jury’s discretion and was thus
constitutional under Jurek.86
The Smith decision was the first time that the Supreme
Court of Virginia interpreted the Commonwealth’s new statutory
scheme to require that the jury look backwards when analyzing a
defendant’s future dangerousness.87 This backwards-looking
interpretation significantly influenced the development of the
court’s death penalty jurisprudence88 and set the tone for the
84. Id. at 149 (footnote omitted).
85. See id. at 149 n.4 (“It should be noted that, while prior criminal conduct
is the Principal [sic] predicate, the statute provides a further predicate, Viz., ‘the
circumstances surrounding the commission of the offense of which (the
defendant) is accused.’”).
86. See id. at 148, 151 (holding that the statute was not unconstitutionally
vague).
87. See id. at 148–49 (indicating that the two predicates upon which a
sentencer can predict future dangerousness are the defendant’s prior criminal
history and the circumstances surrounding the offense—two backwards-looking
predicates).
88. See, e.g., Frye v. Commonwealth, 345 S.E.2d 267, 283 (Va. 1986)
(determining that unadjudicated acts of criminal conduct support a future
dangerousness finding); Edmonds v. Commonwealth, 329 S.E.2d 807, 813 (Va.
1985) (stating that the jury is permitted to consider the “circumstances
surrounding the commission of the offense” and the “heinousness of the crime”
as determinative of future dangerousness), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 975 (1985);
Quintana v. Commonwealth, 295 S.E.2d 643, 655 (Va. 1983) (stating that the
“heinous circumstances surrounding this homicide” is the only evidence needed
to support a finding of future dangerousness), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1029 (1983);
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admissibility (or, rather, nonadmissibility) of base rate-focused
risk assessment evidence.89
B. Abolition of Parole in Virginia Creates a New “Society”
The Virginia General Assembly abolished parole for felony
offenses—which include capital murder90—in 1995.91 A defendant
convicted of capital murder in Virginia now faces only two
possible sentences: life in prison without the possibility of parole,
or death.92 Because a convicted capital defendant will never be
released into society at large even if his life is spared, the only
“society” to which the defendant might pose a threat is prison
society.93 Knowing this, capital defendants have shifted their
defense strategy to focus on the likelihood that they will be a
continuing threat to prison society. But the Supreme Court of
Virginia, over time, has frustrated these efforts.
Clanton v. Commonwealth, 286 S.E.2d 172, 180 (Va. 1982) (providing the
defendant’s prior convictions as evidence of future dangerousness); Clark v.
Commonwealth, 257 S.E.2d 784, 789–90 (Va. 1979) (describing the defendant’s
lack of remorse and prior criminal record as evidence of future dangerousness),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1049 (1980).
89. See infra notes 118–62 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme
Court of Virginia’s more
recent jurisprudence
surrounding the
admission/exclusion of risk assessment evidence).
90. See VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-30 (2013) (“Any person who commits capital
murder, murder of the first degree, murder of the second degree, voluntary
manslaughter, or involuntary manslaughter, shall be guilty of a felony.”).
Capital murder includes fifteen statutorily defined offenses, including murder
for hire, murder during a commission of a robbery, and murder of a lawenforcement officer. Id. § 18.2-31.
91. See id. § 53.1-165.1 (stating that the provisions for parole do not apply
“to any sentence imposed or to any prisoner incarcerated upon a conviction for a
felony offense committed on or after January 1, 1995”). Capital defendants who
are sentenced to life in prison do not have the option to petition for geriatric
parole. See id. § 53.1-40.01 (stating that geriatric parole—parole that may be
granted only after the convict reaches the age of sixty-five—is not eligible to
those persons who were convicted for a Class 1 felony offense). Thus, life
actually means life for capital defendants in Virginia.
92. See id. § 19.2-264.4(A) (“In case of trial by jury, where a sentence of
death is not recommended, the defendant shall be sentenced to imprisonment
for life.”).
93. See id. (providing the only two options that a capital defendant faces if
he or she is convicted: life in prison without the possibility of parole, or death).
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1. An Attempt to Introduce General Prison Evidence Through a
Redefinition of “Society”
Initially, capital defendants argued that, following the
abolition of parole, the statutory definition of “society” should be
limited to prison society because that was the only society in
which a capital defendant would spend the remainder of his life.94
The Supreme Court of Virginia rejected this argument outright,
noting that the statute “requires that the jury make a factual
determination whether the defendant would commit criminal acts
of violence that would constitute a continuing serious threat to
society.”95 The statute does not limit the definition of “society” to
prison society simply because a defendant is ineligible for
parole.96 Because the court was unwilling to “rewrite the statute
to restrict its scope,” it concluded that the statutory term
“society” denotes society at large—a society into which the capital
defendant will never be released.97
Although the Supreme Court of Virginia determined that the
statutory definition of “society” is not exclusively limited to prison
society, capital defendants were still eager to introduce evidence
about general prison conditions, including security measures
taken to prevent violence. Defendants argued that evidence about
prison conditions was relevant as both mitigation98 and rebuttal99
94. See Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 537 S.E.2d 866, 878 (Va. 2000) (“[The
defendant] argues that, since he is ineligible for parole after being convicted of
these offenses, the only society that should be considered in this case for
purposes of ‘future dangerousness’ is prison society.”), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 815
(2001).
95. Id. at 879.
96. See id. (“The statute does not limit this [future dangerousness]
consideration to ‘prison society’ when a defendant is ineligible for parole.”).
97. Id. See also Tanner, supra note 38, at 394 (“[T]he court instead read the
statute to permit the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a
defendant posed a ‘probability’ of serious violence to a community into which he
would never, in fact, be released.”).
98. See Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 284–85 (2004) (defining relevant
mitigating evidence as “evidence which tends logically to prove or disprove some
fact or circumstance which a fact-finder could reasonably deem to have
mitigating value” (citations and quotations omitted)).
99. See Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977) (plurality opinion)
(determining that a defendant is denied due process of law when a capital
defendant is not allowed to present all mitigating evidence—i.e. when a death
sentence is imposed, at least in part, “on the basis of information which he had
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evidence to demonstrate that they would not pose a future danger
if the jury chose to spare their lives.100 The Supreme Court of
Virginia, however, rejected the arguments on both fronts.
2. An Attempt to Introduce General Prison Evidence as Mitigating
Evidence
The Supreme Court of Virginia first rejected defendants’
mitigation argument in Cherrix v. Commonwealth.101 Relying on
a footnote in the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision Lockett v. Ohio,102
the Virginia court noted that a trial court has discretion to
“exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the defendant’s
character, prior record, or the circumstances of his offense.”103
The court determined that because general information about
prisons does not pertain to a defendant’s history or experience, a
trial court could appropriately exclude such prison evidence as
irrelevant.104 The court went on to distinguish the U.S. Supreme
Court’s holding in Skipper v. South Carolina,105 which required
the admission of evidence surrounding the defendant’s own prior
no opportunity to deny or explain”).
100. See Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 642, 653 (Va. 1999) (arguing
that evidence regarding the general nature of prison life and its effect on the
capital defendant’s future dangerousness through testimony of a penologist,
sociologist, and other witnesses was admissible as mitigating evidence), cert.
denied, 528 U.S. 873 (1999); Burns v. Commonwealth, 541 S.E.2d 872, 892–93
(Va. 2001) (arguing that evidence “describing the daily inmate routine, general
prison conditions, and security measures” of maximum-security prisons was
admissible as rebuttal evidence), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1043 (2001).
101. Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 513 S.E.2d 642 (Va. 1999).
102. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978). The Court in Lockett held that
“the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments require that the sentencer, in all but
the rarest kind of capital case, not be precluded from considering, as a
mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant’s character or record and any of the
circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence
less than death.” Id. at 604 (footnotes omitted). The Court stated in a footnote to
this holding, however, that nothing in the Court’s decision “limits the traditional
authority of a court to exclude, as irrelevant, evidence not bearing on the
defendant’s character, prior record, or the circumstances of his offense.” Id. at
604 n.12.
103. Cherrix, 513 S.E.2d at 653 (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 605 n.12).
104. See id. (“We agree with the conclusion of the trial court that ‘what a
person may expect in the penal system’ is not relevant mitigation evidence.”).
105. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986).
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jail behavior, stating that “none of the [general prison] evidence
proffered at trial addressed Cherrix’s ability to conform or his
experience in conforming to prison life, as the defendant’s
evidence did in Skipper.”106 Thus, the Supreme Court of Virginia
made clear that information concerning general prison conditions
alone would not be admitted as mitigating evidence in Virginia
capital sentencing proceedings.
3. An Attempt to Introduce General Prison Evidence as Rebuttal
Evidence
Virginia’s highest court rejected the argument that general
prison life evidence serves as rebuttal evidence in Burns v.
Commonwealth.107 In Burns, the court first noted that the
Commonwealth did not argue anything concerning specific prison
conditions or the likelihood that a prisoner would commit violent
crimes while in prison.108 Thus, the general “prison life” evidence
that the defendant attempted to offer would not actually rebut a
specific argument made by the prosecutor.109
The court also determined that broad “prison life” evidence
could not be proffered as rebuttal evidence to the
Commonwealth’s general future dangerousness claim.110 Because
106. Cherrix, 513 S.E. at 653 n.4 (citing Skipper, 476 U.S. at 4); see also
Tanner, supra note 38, at 392–93 (“The court found that the proffered evidence
regarding the ‘general nature of prison life,’ as opposed to the specific evidence
of the defendant’s own prior jail behavior in Skipper, did not pertain to the
defendant’s history and experience and therefore, was inadmissible as
mitigation evidence.”).
107. See Burns v. Commonwealth, 541 S.E.2d 872, 894 (Va. 2001) (“[W]e find
no error in the circuit court’s decision quashing the subpoena directed to the
Department of Corrections and refusing to admit evidence about prison life in a
maximum security prison in rebuttal to the Commonwealth’s evidence in this
case of Burns’ future dangerousness.”), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 621 (2001).
108. See id. at 893 (“[T]he Commonwealth offered no such evidence
regarding the nature of prison life for a defendant convicted of capital murder or
any other felony. Nor did the Commonwealth introduce evidence about the
number of violent crimes committed in prison or the likelihood that a prisoner
could escape.”).
109. See id. (“Burns’ evidence was not in rebuttal to any evidence concerning
prison life.”).
110. See id. (“Evidence regarding the general nature of prison life in a
maximum security facility is not relevant to that inquiry, even when offered in
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the court interprets Virginia’s death penalty statute to require
the jury to look at particular aspects of the defendant when
addressing future dangerousness,111 the court stated that the
relevant inquiry is “not whether [the defendant] could commit
criminal acts of violence in the future but whether he would.”112
Essentially, the court determined that information involving the
general nature of the prison system and the security measures
taken within prisons to secure inmates has no bearing on
whether a defendant possesses the propensity to commit acts of
violence in the future.113
C. Reforming the Defense Strategy
Following the Supreme Court of Virginia’s decisions
regarding general prison evidence, defense attorneys adjusted
their strategy in an attempt to comply with the court’s rulings.
Recognizing that general “prison life” data was not admissible as
mitigation or rebuttal evidence, capital defendants attempted to
offer individualized assessments, which incorporated prison data
into the evaluation, to demonstrate the defendant’s improbability
of committing violent acts in the future.114 The Supreme Court of
Virginia quickly rejected this revised approach in Juniper v.

rebuttal to evidence of future dangerousness such as that presented in this
case.”).
111. See id. (“[T]he focus must be on the particular facts of Burns’ history
and background, and the circumstances of his offense.”).
112. Id.
113. See id. (“[A] determination of future dangerousness revolves around an
individual defendant and a specific crime. Evidence regarding the general
nature of prison life in a maximum security facility is not relevant to that
inquiry, even when offered in rebuttal to evidence of future dangerousness.”).
114. See Opening Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, at 42 (“The defense
sought to introduce the expert opinion . . . that, based on [the defendant’s]
particular character, history, and background, he would be a low risk for
violence in prison and would adapt positively to the prison environment.”).
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Commonwealth,115 Porter v. Commonwealth,116 and Morva v.
Commonwealth.117
1. Juniper v. Commonwealth
In Juniper, the defendant requested that his court-appointed
psychologist, Dr. Thomas Pasquale, testify that “Juniper’s risk
assessment for future dangerousness was different in a prison
setting from that in an ‘open community.’”118 The Supreme Court
of Virginia affirmed the trial court’s denial of this request, stating
that
[w]hile Dr. Pasquale may not have sought to offer specific
evidence on a day in the life of a prisoner, as in Cherrix, he
offered nothing to the trial court to support his opinion as
being based on Juniper’s individual characteristics that would
affect his future adaptability in prison and thus relate to a
defendant-specific assessment of future dangerousness.119

The court determined that the psychologist’s testimony was not
sufficiently individualized to the defendant so as to conform to
the court’s prior decisions, and the testimony was properly
precluded as irrelevant.120
2. Porter v. Commonwealth
In Porter, the defense again attempted to introduce evidence
concerning the defendant’s risk of future dangerousness in a
narrowly tailored way. The defendant requested the appointment
of Prison Expert Dr. Mark D. Cunningham “as an expert on the
assessment of the risk of violence by prison inmates and, in
115. Juniper v. Commonwealth, 626 S.E.2d 383 (Va. 2006), cert. denied, 549
U.S. 960 (2006).
116. Porter v. Commonwealth, 661 S.E.2d 415 (Va. 2008), cert. denied, 556
U.S. 1189 (2009).
117. Morva v. Commonwealth, 683 S.E.2d 553 (Va. 2009), cert. denied, 131
S.Ct. 97 (2010).
118. Juniper, 626 S.E.2d at 422.
119. Id. at 424.
120. See id. (“The trial court thus correctly barred Dr. Pasquale’s
generalized testimony and did not abuse its discretion in doing so.”).
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particular, the risk of future dangerousness posed by the
defendant if incarcerated in a Virginia penitentiary for life.”121 In
support of this request, the defense claimed that the Supreme
Court of Virginia’s prior decisions denying the introduction of
such evidence were decided incorrectly, arguing that some
evidence of prison life must be allowed to properly assess and
predict a defendant’s future dangerousness.122 Porter argued that
“context and statistical and actuarial data . . . are indispensable
to the determination of risk” because “it is manifestly impossible
for a defendant adequately to explain why he is not a continuing
serious threat to society without introducing evidence of the
conditions of prison incarceration, including prison security and
the actual rates of serious criminal violence in prison.”123
In response to Porter’s request, Virginia’s highest court
reiterated, as it had in its prior decisions, that Virginia’s death
penalty statute dictates that a defendant’s future dangerousness
should only be determined by looking at three specific criteria:
the defendant’s past criminal record, prior history, and the
circumstances surrounding the offense.124 Because Dr.
Cunningham’s report involved a review of general prison data
and conditions—and did not exclusively focus on the three
criteria dictated by the statute—the trial court properly excluded
the risk assessment as irrelevant to the question of future
dangerousness.125

121. Porter, 661 S.E.2d at 435.
122. See id. at 436 (“In his Prison Expert Motion, however, Porter primarily
focused on criticizing prior decisions of this Court regarding prison risk
assessment experts and lauding the virtues of various statistical modes of
analysis to project rates of prison inmate violence.”).
123. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
124. See id. at 437 (“The plain directive of these statutes is that the
determination of future dangerousness is focused on the defendant’s ‘past
criminal record,’ ‘prior history’ and ‘the circumstances surrounding the
commission of the offense.’”).
125. See id. at 442 (“Porter’s proffer in the Prison Expert Motion fails to
address the statutory factors under Code § 19.2-264.2 and 19.2-264.4(C) as
being individualized and particularized as to Porter’s prior history, conviction
record and the circumstances of the crime.”).
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3. Morva v. Commonwealth

With these decisions as precedent, capital defendants once
more adjusted their defense strategy knowing that they were
fighting an uphill battle. In Morva, the defense again requested
that Dr. Mark Cunningham be appointed as an Expert on Prison
Risk Assessment.126 And again the defense argued that a risk
assessment expert was needed in order to effectively present
mitigating evidence and to rebut assertions of future
dangerousness by the Commonwealth.127 This case was
distinguishable from prior cases, argued the defense, because
Morva’s proffered risk assessment was much more individualized
than those proffered in past cases.128 Morva stated that the risk
assessment in Porter was rejected because “[a]t no place in the
motion [did Porter] proffer that Dr. Cunningham’s statistical
analysis of a projected prison environment [would] focus . . . on
the particular facts of [his] history and background, and the
circumstances of his offense.”129 Morva’s proffered risk
assessment, on the other hand, integrated individualized
characteristics into Dr. Cunningham’s statistical analysis and
thus conformed to the court’s risk assessment precedent.130 Dr.
Cunningham proposed to “factor into his statistical analysis
individualized characteristics that have been shown to reduce the
likelihood of future violent behavior in prison, including Morva’s
126. See Morva v. Commonwealth, 683 S.E.2d 553, 561 (Va. 2009) (noting
the defense’s motion for Dr. Cunningham’s appointment).
127. See id. at 562
Morva stated that he could not “effectively rebut assertions of ‘future
dangerousness’ by the Commonwealth unless he [were] given the
tools with which to inform the jury how to make reliable assessments
of the likelihood of serious violence by an individual defendant in [a]
prison setting—including security and the actual prevalence of
serious violence” in a prison setting, which Dr. Cunningham’s
testimony would provide.
128. See id. at 563 (“Morva claims that the proffer provided by Dr.
Cunningham in this case is distinguishable from the proffer we held insufficient
in Porter.”).
129. Id. (citations omitted).
130. See id. (“Due to the integration of these factors into the analysis, Morva
claims that Dr. Cunningham’s testimony would have been ‘individualized’ to
Morva rather than simply a generalization applicable to any convicted
murderer.”).
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prior behavior while incarcerated, age, level of educational
attainment, and appraisals of his security requirements during
prior incarceration.”131
In response to the defense’s argument, the Commonwealth
cited the court’s prior decisions and contended that Dr.
Cunningham’s testimony was not relevant as mitigating evidence
because his “testimony would have related to conditions of
confinement, not to Morva, and that such testimony, therefore,
was not ‘particularized’ to Morva.”132 The Commonwealth also
argued that because it had not introduced any evidence
concerning Morva’s potential prison life—but, instead, limited its
evidence “to the statutory requirements consisting of Morva’s
prior history and the circumstances surrounding the offense”—
Dr. Cunningham’s assessment did not rebut any specific evidence
concerning prison life.133
The Supreme Court of Virginia once again reiterated the
principle that “[t]he specific language of the controlling statutes,
Code §§ 19.2-264.2 and 19.2-264.4(C), dictates what evidence is
relevant to the inquiry concerning future dangerousness.”134 This
language directs that the “relevant inquiry is not whether [a
defendant] could commit criminal acts of violence in the future
but whether he would.”135 Thus, the death penalty statutes define
the relevant evidence regarding the issue of future
dangerousness, and a defendant’s probability of committing
future acts of violence is not determined based on the
Commonwealth’s ability to secure the defendant in prison but
rather the defendant’s history and the circumstances surrounding
the defendant’s offense.136
The court went on to state that “[t]o be admissible, evidence
relating to a prison environment must connect the specific
characteristics of the particular defendant to his future
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 563–64.
134. Id. at 564.
135. Id. (quoting Burns v. Commonwealth, 541 S.E.2d 872, 893 (Va. 2001)).
136. See id. at 565 (“Code §§ 19.2-264.2 and 19.2-264.4(C) do not put at issue
the Commonwealth’s ability to secure the defendant in prison. The relevant
evidence surrounding a determination of future dangerousness consists of the
defendant’s history and the circumstances of the defendant’s offense.”).
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adaptability in the prison environment.”137 If the defense wishes
to present evidence of conditions of prison life and the security
measures used in maximum security facilities, the defense must
ensure that the evidence “is specific to the defendant on trial and
relevant to that specific defendant’s ability to adjust to prison
life.”138 The court then determined that Dr. Cunningham’s
proffered testimony of prison life was inadmissible because it
considered “general factors concerning prison procedure and
security that are not individualized as to Morva’s prior history,
conviction record, or the circumstances of his offense.”139 Thus,
Dr. Cunningham’s testimony was properly excluded by the trial
court.140
D. Where We End Up: Lawlor v. Commonwealth
The Supreme Court of Virginia’s decision in Morva gave
capital defense attorneys a scintilla of hope. In its ruling, the
court acknowledged that evidence relating to the prison
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 566. The court discussed the different aspects of Dr.
Cunningham’s evaluation that made the evidence inadmissible. Dr.
Cunningham proposed to testify about “Virginia Department of Corrections’
procedures and security interventions that would act to significantly reduce the
likelihood of an inmate engaging in serous violence in prison.” Id. at 565. But
the court noted that “Dr. Cunningham does not claim that the use or
effectiveness of such interventions is related in any way to Morva’s individual
history, conviction record, or circumstances of his offense.” Id. The court then
went on to explain itself:
The fact that being an inmate in a single cell, locked down twentythree hours a day, with individual or small group exercise, and
shackled movement under escort would greatly reduce opportunity
for serious violence toward others, is not particular to Morva. It is
true for any other inmate as well, and it is evidence of the
effectiveness of general prison security, which is not relevant to the
issue of Morva’s future dangerousness. Whether offered by an expert,
or anyone else, evidence of prison life and the security measures used
in a prison environment are not relevant to future dangerousness
unless it connects the specific characteristics of a particular
defendant to his future adaptability in the prison environment.
Id. at 565–66.
140. See id. at 566 (“[T]he circuit court did not err or abuse its discretion in
denying the motion to appoint Dr. Cunningham as an expert for Morva.”).
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environment—evidence that the defense would like to offer as
rebuttal and mitigation to the Commonwealth’s claim that a
capital defendant will be dangerous in the future—may be
admitted so long as it was properly individualized.141 It seemed
that the court had not foreclosed the introduction of general
prison evidence completely. This notion was quickly challenged in
Lawlor v. Commonwealth.
In Lawlor, the defense sought to introduce Dr. Mark
Cunningham’s expert opinion—as both mitigating and rebuttal
evidence—that, “based on Mr. Lawlor’s particular character,
history, and background, he would be a low risk for violence in
prison and would adapt positively to the prison environment.”142
Although the trial court admitted Dr. Cunningham as an expert
witness, the trial court rejected most of his testimony on the issue
of future dangerousness because the testimony included Dr.
Cunningham’s expert opinion regarding Lawlor’s likelihood to
pose a future threat of danger to prison society only.143 Dr.
Cunningham attempted to discuss Lawlor’s “specific employment
history, continued contact with family and friends while in
prison, and past appraisals by correctional officers,” and would
have testified that these factors are “predictive that Mr. Lawlor
represents a low likelihood of committing acts of violence while in
141. See id. at 565
To be admissible, evidence relating to a prison environment must
connect the specific characteristics of the particular defendant to his
future adaptability in the prison environment. . . . It must be evidence
peculiar to the defendant’s character, history, and background in
order to be relevant to the future dangerousness inquiry. . . .
Conditions of prison life and the security measures utilized in a
maximum security facility are not relevant to the future dangerousness
inquiry unless such evidence is specific to the defendant on trial and
relevant to that specific defendant’s ability to adjust to prison life.
(emphasis added) (citations omitted).
142. Opening Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, at 42; see also Lawlor v.
Commonwealth, 738 S.E.2d 847, 882 (Va. 2013) (“Lawlor argues that Dr.
Cunningham’s testimony was not about generalized prison conditions. He
argues it was sufficiently particularized based on attributes such as his age,
prior behavior while incarcerated, education, and employment history, which
are admissible under Morva.”).
143. See Opening Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, at 42 (“Although brief
snippets of Dr. Cunningham’s testimony were not excluded, the court generally,
and emphatically, excluded it because the testimony focused on Mr. Lawlor’s
risk of serious violence in prison.”).
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prison.”144 The trial court sustained the Commonwealth’s
objections to this testimony based on the Commonwealth’s
argument that the Supreme Court of Virginia’s prior decision
made clear that the issue of future dangerousness may not be
limited to prison society.145 The trial court reasoned that “when
[Lawlor] or his witness tried to narrow the [statutory] language
from ‘society’ to ‘prison society,’” it would be “misleading to the
jury.”146
1. Lawlor’s Risk Assessment as Rebuttal Evidence
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Virginia took each of the
defense’s arguments in turn. Concerning the argument that Dr.
Cunningham’s testimony was admissible as rebuttal evidence,
the defense argued that Dr. Cunningham’s testimony did not
merely discuss general prison conditions and was sufficiently
particularized to the defendant as required by the court’s decision
in Morva.147 The defense argued that the trial court erred in
144. Id. at 44–45 (emphasis added). Dr. Cunningham’s testimony would
have concluded with the following:
Q: Have you reached an opinion, to a reasonable degree of
psychological certainty, based on all of the factors relevant to your
studies of prison risk assessment, as to what Mark Lawlor’s risk level
is for committing acts of violence while incarcerated? And if so, what
is your opinion?
A: Yes. It is my opinion based on my analysis of all of the relevant
risk factors which are specific to Mr. Lawlor’s prior history and
background, that Mr. Lawlor represents a very low risk for
committing acts of violence while incarcerated.
Q: Are all of your opinions concerning the above questions and
answers about Mr. Lawlor grounded in scientific research and peer
reviewed scientific literature?
A: Yes.
Id. at 45.
145. See Brief of the Commonwealth, supra note 2, at 36 (“The
Commonwealth argued, and the [trial] court agreed, that th[e] [Supreme Court
of Virginia] has made clear that the issue of future dangerousness may not be
limited to prison society.”).
146. Id.
147. See Morva v. Commonwealth, 683 S.E.2d 553, 565 (Va. 2009) (“To be
admissible, evidence relating to a prison environment must connect the specific
characteristics of the particular defendant to his future adaptability in the
prison environment.”).
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excluding the testimony due to the fact that it was limited to the
prison environment because if Lawlor was sentenced to life
imprisonment, “prison society would be the only society to which
he could pose a risk.”148
Addressing this argument, the court emphasized that “the
question of future dangerousness is about the defendant’s
volition, not his opportunity, to commit acts of violence. Evidence
of custodial restrictions on opportunity therefore is not
admissible.”149 Citing Morva v. Commonwealth,150 the court
reiterated that the issue “is not whether the defendant is
physically capable of committing violence, but whether he has the
mental inclination to do so.”151 Because Dr. Cunningham’s
testimony was limited to prison society only,152 it was irrelevant
to the statutory language that requires a future-dangerousness
assessment to consider society as a whole.153 The court
determined that “[t]o be admissible as evidence rebutting the
future dangerousness aggravating factor under the statutes,
expert opinion testimony must not narrowly assess the
defendant’s continuing threat to prison society alone.”154 As such,
the court determined that Dr. Cunningham’s testimony was
properly excluded as irrelevant to the issue of future
dangerousness.155

148. Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 738 S.E.2d 847, 882 (Va. 2013).
149. Id.
150. See supra notes 126–39 and accompanying text (discussing Morva).
151. Lawlor, 738 S.E.2d at 882.
152. See id. (“It expressed Dr. Cunningham’s opinion of Lawlor’s risk of
future violence in prison society only, rather than society as a whole.”).
153. See id. at 883 (“‘[The statute] requires that the jury make a factual
determination whether the defendant ‘would commit criminal acts of violence
that would constitute a continuing serious threat to society.’ The statute does
not limit this consideration to ‘prison society’ when a defendant is ineligible for
parole.’” (quoting Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 537 S.E.2d 866, 879 (Va. 2000)).
154. Id.
155. See id. (stating that “evidence concerning a defendant’s probability of
committing future violent acts, limited to the penal environment, is not relevant
to consideration of the future dangerousness aggravating factor set forth” in the
statute).
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2. Lawlor’s Risk Assessment as Mitigating Evidence

The defense also argued that Dr. Cunningham’s testimony
was admissible as mitigating evidence because jurors could
reasonably find “that evidence of Mr. Lawlor’s low risk of violence
in prison (where he would be spending his entire life) warranted
a sentence less than death.”156 The defense maintained that Dr.
Cunningham’s testimony did not constitute general evidence
about what a person may expect in the prison setting, but rather
his testimony concerned the defendant’s “specific characteristics,
such as his age, employment history, and ongoing connections
with friends and family.”157
In response to this argument, the court noted that “[a]s with
evidence rebutting the future dangerousness aggravating factor,
the relevant inquiry is narrowly focused on whether the
particular defendant is inclined to commit violence in prison, not
whether prison security or conditions of confinement render him
incapable of committing such violence.”158 The court determined
that to satisfy Morva’s standard, “the evidence must consist of
more than the recitation of shared attributes as the basis for
predicting similar behavior.”159 Statistical evidence regarding
attributes shared by the defendant with others, and statistical
models based on that evidence predicting the likelihood of
violence in the future, are irrelevant.160 Dr. Cunningham’s
proffered testimony merely
156. Opening Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, at 47.
157. Id. at 48–49.
158. Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 738 S.E.2d 847, 883 (Va. 2013). The court
went on to note that “testimony relevant to a defendant’s propensity to commit
violence while incarcerated necessarily must be personalized to the defendant
based on his specific, individual past behavior or record. Otherwise it cannot
constitute evidence of the defendant’s personal character and would be
irrelevant even for purposes of mitigation.” Id. at 883–84.
159. Id. at 884.
160. See id.
[T]he mere fact that an attribute is shared by others from whom a
statistical model has been compiled, and that the statistical model
predicts certain behavior, is neither relevant to the defendant’s
character nor a foundation for expert opinion. . . . Merely stating that
the percentage of violent crimes committed by a specified
demographic group sharing one of the defendant’s attributes is lower,
based on statistical models, than others who do not share it does not
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(a) suppl[ied] an item of demographic data coupled with an
unexplained, conclusory opinion that the datum indicates
Lawlor will present a low risk of violence while incarcerated or
(b) la[id] the foundation that the opinion is based on statistical
models. While each datum is extracted from Lawlor’s personal
history, it sheds no light on his character, why he committed
his past crimes and the crime for which he stood convicted, or
how would it influence or affect his behavior while
incarcerated.161

Thus, the Supreme Court of Virginia held that the trial court
did not err by excluding Dr. Cunningham’s testimony.162
V. Argument
Lawlor
redefined
Virginia’s
future
dangerousness
aggravating factor entirely. In effect, the redefined aggravating
factor no longer requires capital juries to perform a forwardlooking risk assessment when conducting a future-dangerousness
analysis.163 Virginia capital juries are now required to conduct a
character-based evaluation to determine a defendant’s likelihood
of committing future violent acts.164 This section discusses the
court’s redefinition of the future dangerousness aggravating
factor, highlighting the ways in which this redefinition
completely changes the future dangerousness game in Virginia—
drastically
diverging
from
every
other
jurisdiction’s
interpretation of the aggravating factor—and runs afoul of both

suffice.
(citations omitted).
161. Id. at 885. The court held that one proffered answer was admissible,
namely one that “establishes the fact that Lawlor did not engage in violent
behavior during past periods of incarceration.” Id. However, this fact was
already known to the jury through other evidence and consequently the trial
court did not abuse its discretion. Id.
162. See id. (“In short, the proffered testimony is not probative of Lawlor’s
disposition to make a well-behaved and peaceful adjustment to life in prison.
Accordingly, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in excluding these
questions and answers.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)).
163. See infra notes 179–79 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s
redefinition of the future dangerousness statutory aggravating factor).
164. See infra notes 176–79 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s
redefinition into a character-based assessment).
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the Eighth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
A. The Realities of Lawlor
The Supreme Court of Virginia’s decision in Lawlor was
novel in many respects. Lawlor was the first decision to place an
absolute bar on admission of base rate-focused risk assessments
in Virginia capital trials.165 It also marked the first time that the
court definitively redefined Virginia’s future dangerousness
aggravating factor to be a character assessment rather than a
forward-looking dangerousness assessment.166 And, most
importantly, the decision was the first time that the Virginia
court departed so radically from all other interpretations of
future dangerousness.167 These “firsts,” taken together, have
significant constitutional implications for the Virginia death
penalty statutory scheme.
1. Total Exclusion of Base Rate-Focused Risk Assessments
The Supreme Court of Virginia held in Lawlor that Dr.
Cunningham’s risk assessment testimony was not relevant as
mitigating or rebuttal evidence and thus was inadmissible.168
Quite simply, the court rejected an unchallenged risk assessment
that would have taken into account every aspect of the
165. See infra notes 165–75 and accompanying text (discussing the total
exclusion of base-rate focused risk assessments).
166. See infra notes 176–79 and accompanying text (discussing the
redefinition of the future dangerousness aggravating factor).
167. See infra notes 180–93 and accompanying text (discussing Virginia’s
radical departure from other jurisdictions).
168. See Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 738 S.E.2d 847, 883 (Va. 2013) (“To be
admissible as evidence rebutting the future dangerousness aggravating factor
under the statutes, expert opinion testimony must not narrowly assess the
defendant’s continuing threat to prison society alone. The court therefore did not
abuse its discretion by excluding Dr. Cunningham’s testimony as rebuttal
evidence on the future dangerousness.”); id. at 885 (“[The evidence] sheds no
light on [Lawlor’s] character, why he committed his past crimes and the crime
for which he stood convicted, or how would it influence or affect his behavior
while incarcerated. It therefore is not personalized for the purposes of
establishing future adaptability.”).
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defendant’s character, background, and offense only because Dr.
Cunningham proposed to connect his assessment to the
defendant’s known future environment—prison.169 While the
court did not state it explicitly, its holding in Lawlor essentially
prohibits all valid prison violence risk assessments from entering
into the future dangerousness equation. This is because a wellfounded risk assessment for a capital defendant cannot be done
without prison data.170 No scientifically defensible risk
assessment will exclude the setting in which risk is to be assessed
or the base rates of violence in that setting.171 This is especially
true for a capital sentencing risk assessment, as it is extremely
relevant “to consider that prison is a highly structured and
intensively supervised setting quite distinct from free society,
warranting utilization of base rates that are specific to that

169. See id. at 883 (“[E]vidence concerning a defendant’s probability of
committing future violent acts, limited to the penal environment, is not relevant
to consideration of the future dangerousness aggravating factor set forth in
[Virginia’s death penalty statute].”); id. at 884
We stress that characteristics alone are not character. Merely
extracting a set of objective attributes about the defendant and
inserting them into a statistical model created by compiling
comparable attributes from others, to attempt to predict the
probability of the defendant’s future behavior based on others’ past
behavior does not fulfill the requirement that evidence be “peculiar to
the defendant’s character, history, and background” under Morva.
170. See supra notes 58–75 and accompanying text (discussing defense
experts’ risk assessment method); see also Morva v. Commonwealth, 683 S.E.2d
553, 572 (Va. 2009) (Koontz, J., dissenting)
By holding that this evidence regarding “context” is inadmissible, the
majority effectively excludes all future prison risk assessment
evidence and establishes a per se rule of inadmissibility because, as
Dr. Cunningham stated, the conditions of confinement are a
necessary component of such an assessment. The majority fails to
recognize that when calculating the risk of future violent acts, “prison
life” evidence is relevant and essential to achieving an individualized
prediction.
171. See Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 41, at 75 (“‘It is clear that in
order to adequately predict individual aggressive behavior, one must know
something about the environment in which the individual is functioning.’”
(citations omitted)); Cunningham & Sorensen, supra note 40, at 71 (“As a
growing body of data reflects, the serious prison violence of concern to capital
risk assessments has a very low base rate. These low base rates provide a
critically important foundation for reliable risk assessments for prison, not an
impediment to them.”).
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context.”172 Consequently, a risk assessment for a capital
defendant that omits the relevant prison violence base rate from
the evaluation will be fundamentally speculative and
inaccurate.173
Thus, the holding in Lawlor ensures that base rate-focused
risk assessments will never be admitted. Base rates represent
data from the general prison environment, and Lawlor makes
clear that such general prison evidence will never be
admissible.174 It is ironic that the court considers a base rate—
which, as previously discussed, is considered the most critical
component of a reliable risk assessment175—as “speculation.”176
This is because the only alternative to base rate-focused risk
assessments is precisely that: jury speculation.177 Without
evidence grounded in scientifically sound predictions, jurors will
rely on conjecture, intuition, personal biases, and misinformation
to assess the defendant’s likelihood of future violent acts.178
Nonetheless, the court’s decision effectively prohibits capital
172. Cunningham & Reidy, supra note 41, at 75.
173. See Cunningham & Sorensen, supra note 40, at 71 (“‘[T]he most
common significant error made by clinicians in the prediction of violent behavior
relates to ignorance of information surrounding the statistical base rate of
violence in the population in question.’” (citations omitted)); Cunningham, supra
note 51, at 836 (“Broadly conceptualized, accuracy in probability estimates
requires statistical data specifying the rate of violence in a similarly situated
group or in the face of a particular characteristic. Inaccuracy occurs when such
data are unavailable or when the available data are ignored.”). See also supra
notes 58–75 and accompanying text (discussing base rates).
174. See Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 738 S.E.2d 847, 883 (Va. 2013) (“The
statute does not limit this consideration to ‘prison society’ when a defendant is
ineligible for parole, and we decline [the defendant’s] effective request that we
rewrite the statute to restrict its scope.” (quoting Lovitt v. Commonwealth, 537
S.E.2d 866, 879 (Va. 2000))); id. at 884 (“Merely stating that the percentage of
violent crimes committed by a specified demographic group [in the prison
environment] sharing one of the defendant’s attributes is lower, based on
statistical models, than others who do not share it does not suffice.”).
175. See supra notes 58–75 and accompanying text (discussing the
importance of base rates to a valid risk assessment).
176. Lawlor, 738 S.E.2d at 884 (quoting Porter v. Commonwealth, 661
S.E.2d 415, 442 (Va. 2008)).
177. See supra notes 39–57 and accompanying text (discussing speculation
in future dangerousness predictions when base rates are not incorporated into
the equation).
178. See Sorensen & Pilgrim, supra note 18, at 1254 (“[J]urors’ assessments
of future dangerousness is highly subjective.”).
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defendants from presenting as part of their defense a
scientifically reliable risk assessment, a decision that has
significant consequences for the meaning of the future
dangerousness aggravating factor in Virginia.
2. Virginia’s Future Dangerousness Aggravating Factor No
Longer Requires Juries to Perform Forward-Looking Risk
Assessments
The Lawlor court justified its exclusion of prison violence risk
assessments on the grounds that Virginia’s death penalty statute
decrees what evidence is relevant to the future dangerousness
inquiry.179 “The relevant evidence is ‘the past criminal record of
convictions of the defendant,’ . . . and ‘evidence of the prior
history of the defendant or of the circumstances surrounding the
commission of the offense of which he is accused.’”180 The court
made clear that, under Virginia’s death penalty statute, context
is not relevant to a future dangerousness assessment in any way.
The court also reiterated its holding from prior decisions that “the
question of future dangerousness is about the defendant’s
volition, not his opportunity, to commit acts of violence.”181
It follows that in order to satisfy Virginia’s future
dangerousness aggravating factor, the jury must not engage in a
forward-looking risk assessment to determine whether the
defendant is actually likely to commit future acts of violence.
Instead, the court’s requirement that the jury assess whether the
defendant has the “mental inclination” to commit violence—based
on statutorily defined, backwards-looking evidence—effectively
requires the jury to engage in a subjective character assessment
of the defendant.182 The jury must determine whether the
179. See Lawlor, 738 S.E.2d at 881 (“The statutes . . . define the evidence
relevant to prove the future dangerousness aggravating factor, or the
probability that the defendant ‘would commit criminal acts of violence that
would constitute a continuing serious threat to society.’”).
180. Id. (citations omitted).
181. Id. at 882. See also Morva v. Commonwealth, 683 S.E.2d 553, 565
(2009) (“Our precedent is clear that a court should exclude evidence concerning
the defendant’s diminished opportunities to commit criminal acts of violence in
the future due to the security conditions in the prison.”).
182. See Lawlor v. Commonwealth, 738 S.E.2d 847, 882 (Va. 2013) (“[T]he
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defendant possesses certain characteristics, based on his
background, character, and record, that tend to show he is a
person of violent character. In other words, the jury must make a
finding as to whether or not the capital offense he committed was
“in character.” This redefinition of the future dangerousness
statutory aggravating factor departs drastically from all other
jurisdictions’ interpretation of future dangerousness, and it is
certainly not what the Supreme Court intended “future
dangerousness” to mean when it decided Jurek v. Texas.
3. Virginia’s Redefinition Diverges From Every Other Jurisdiction
The Supreme Court of Virginia’s redefinition is in conflict
with every other jurisdiction that has similar “future
dangerousness” sentencing factors in its death penalty statutory
schemes. This divergence is most obviously discerned by a
comparison with the architect of the “future dangerousness”
statute, Texas.183 Recognizing that the terms in the death penalty
statute relating to future dangerousness should be interpreted
according to their “ordinary meaning,”184 Texas courts
understand that a future dangerousness assessment means that
“the State has the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that there is a probability that [the defendant] would commit
criminal acts of violence in the future, so as to constitute a
continuing threat, whether in or out of prison.”185 Accordingly,
Texas courts consistently permit capital defendants to present
risk-assessment evidence that takes into account general prison
conditions.186
issue is not whether the defendant is physically capable of committing violence,
but whether he has the mental inclination to do so.”); see also id. at 883 (“[T]he
relevant inquiry is narrowly focused on whether the particular defendant is
inclined to commit violence in prison, not whether prison security or conditions
of confinement render him incapable of committing such violence. Unlike
inclination or volition, capacity—i.e., what a prisoner could do—is not relevant
to character.”).
183. See supra note 23 and accompanying text (discussing Texas as the first
state to use future dangerousness in its sentencing scheme).
184. King v. State, 553 S.W.2d 105, 107 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
185. Druery v. State, 225 S.W.3d 491, 506–07 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
186. See, e.g., Matson v. State, 819 S.W.2d 839, 852–54 (Tex. Crim. App.
1991) (finding reversible error to exclude actuarial testimony by risk-assessment
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Oregon also interprets its future dangerousness statutory
language “as those words are commonly understood.”187 Because a
future dangerousness inquiry necessarily involves a forwardlooking assessment, Oregon courts allow capital defendants to
introduce risk assessments that take into account their future
environment.188 Thus, capital defendants in Oregon are generally
allowed to present risk assessment evidence that incorporates
general prison conditions, including prison security measures.189
And Oklahoma courts, like Oregon and Texas courts, define
future dangerousness according to the “common sense” meaning
of the term.190 Oklahoma’s future dangerousness statutory
aggravating factor is “phrased in conventional and
understandable terms, . . . and presents the sentencer with the
type of forward-looking inquiry that is a permissible part of the
expert). The Matson court rejected the State’s argument that the expert’s
testimony was inadmissible because “the witness based his opinion on
experience in the criminal justice system and probability estimates ‘in general’
rather than on individuals with characteristics and backgrounds similar to
those of appellant,” because denying the defendant the opportunity to present
this evidence “would be tantamount to preventing appellant from presenting his
own side of the case.” Id. at 852–53. See also Anderson v. Quarterman, 204 Fed.
App’x 402, 406 (5th Cir. 2006) (noting that at trial, defense counsel presented
testimony from a psychologist, who testified that “testing had confirmed that
Anderson was dangerous but that he believed that the security in the Texas
prison system would be able to prevent Anderson from committing violent acts
in prison”); Threadgill v. State, 146 S.W.3d 654, 671 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)
(noting that the trial court allowed the defendant to call the prison warden to
testify “about the prison classification system and controls in place to maintain
security and safety within the prison system”).
187. State v. Tucker, 845 P.2d 904, 914 (Or. 1993).
188. See State v. Douglas, 800 P.2d 288, 296 (Or. 1990) (“When the jury
considers the threat that the defendant might pose because of future violent
crimes, it may consider the threat to prison society.”).
189. See, e.g., id. at 296
The evidence in a particular case could make an instruction on the
possibility of release relevant to the jury’s assessment of future
dangerousness. For example, an expert might testify that the
defendant would not pose a threat to prison society, because of its
structured environment, but would pose a threat to society at large, if
released.
190. See Sanchez v. State, 223 P.3d 980, 1007 (Okla. Crim. App. 2009)
(noting that the future dangerousness aggravating factor “is not
unconstitutional if it has some common sense core of meaning . . . that criminal
juries should be capable of understanding” (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted)).
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sentencing process.”191 Because a future dangerousness
assessment necessarily involves a forward-looking evaluation,
Oklahoma courts allow defendants to proffer base rate-focused
risk assessment evidence.192 Likewise, Idaho courts interpret its
future dangerousness statutory language as requiring a forwardlooking assessment of the defendant’s probability to commit
dangerous acts in the future but have not yet evaluated the
admissibility of base rate-focused risk assessment evidence.193
The jurisdictions discussed in this section all follow the U.S.
Supreme Court’s interpretation of what it means for the jury to
make a “future dangerousness” assessment.194 That is to say, a
future dangerousness inquiry involves a capital jury “predict[ing]
future behavior.”195 The Supreme Court of Virginia’s redefinition
of the future dangerousness aggravating factor from a forwardlooking risk assessment to a character-based risk assessment
diverges from this commonsense interpretation, and Virginia’s
future dangerousness statutory aggravating factor can no longer
191. Id. at 1008 (emphasis added) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
192. See Rojem v. State, 207 P.3d 385, 390–91 (Okla. Crim. App. 2009)
(discussing Dr. Cunningham’s testimony at sentencing, for which “Cunningham
created a developmental profile for [the defendant] explaining the formative
basis for his decision-making, as well as a risk assessment profile to determine
his potential for future dangerousness in prison”); Hanson v. State, 72 P.3d 40,
51–53 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003)
This Court has never held inadmissible evidence of a defendant’s
propensity for future violence, in or out of prison, to support
continuing threat. Both this Court and the Supreme Court have
explicitly held that psychiatric evidence is relevant on this issue. Its
scientific reliability has long been accepted. This Court has not held
that the specific “risk assessment” evidence of future dangerousness,
combining clinical results with a defendant’s own history, is
inadmissible. Neither this Court nor the United States Supreme
Court have suggested that this evidence would be irrelevant on the
issue of future dangerousness.
193. See State v. Creech, 670 P.2d 463, 472 (1983) (citing Jurek v. Texas and
discussing future dangerousness as requiring a prediction of future behavior).
Additionally, after extensive research it appears that Wyoming courts have
neither interpreted the meaning of its future dangerousness statutory
aggravating factor nor evaluated the admissibility of base rate-focused risk
assessment evidence.
194. See supra notes 23–33 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of future dangerousness).
195. Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274 (1976).
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be justified by the Supreme Court’s decision in Jurek.196
Consequently,
a
reexamination
of
Virginia’s
future
dangerousness statutory aggravating factor is needed. As
evidenced below, Virginia’s future dangerousness aggravating
factor, as the Virginia Supreme Court now interprets it, no longer
survives constitutional scrutiny.
B. The Troubling Implications of Lawlor
The Supreme Court of Virginia’s redefinition of the statutory
aggravating factor from a forward-looking risk assessment to a
subjective character assessment is troubling because of its
constitutional implications. The redefinition of the aggravating
factor produces significant Eighth Amendment issues in light of
the provision’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.
This section discusses the constitutional concerns that are raised
by the Virginia court’s interpretation of future dangerousness in
Lawlor.
1. The Redefined Statute Violates the Eighth Amendment’s
Prohibition Against the Arbitrary Implementation of the
Death Penalty
The Supreme Court has recognized that the Eighth
Amendment’s ban on cruel and unusual punishments prohibits
capital punishment sentencing procedures that create a
substantial risk of arbitrary and capricious imposition.197 In
essence, “capital punishment [must] be imposed fairly, and with
reasonable consistency, or not at all.”198 To ensure consistent and
fair application of the death penalty, an aggravating
196. See Smith v. Commonwealth, 248 S.E.2d 135, 148 (Va. 1978) (upholding
Virginia’s future dangerousness statutory aggravating factor based principally
on the Supreme Court’s approval of the aggravating factor in Jurek).
197. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 256 (1972) (Douglas, J.,
concurring) (“The high service rendered by the ‘cruel and unusual’ punishment
clause . . . is to require legislatures to write penal laws that are evenhanded,
nonselective, and nonarbitrary, and to require judges to see to it that general
laws are not applied sparsely, selectively, and spottily to unpopular groups.”).
198. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982).
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circumstance must meet two specific constitutional requirements:
it cannot apply to every convicted murderer and it cannot be
unconstitutionally vague, in the sense that the language of the
aggravating circumstance itself fails to provide “any guidance to
the sentencer.”199
Virginia’s future dangerousness statutory aggravating factor
is not necessarily unconstitutional on its face.200 Rather, it is the
Supreme Court of Virginia’s redefinition that runs afoul of the
Constitution. As discussed above, the court’s redefinition asks the
jury to conduct a character-based assessment of the capital
defendant to determine whether it is likely, given the defendant’s
disposition, that he would commit violent acts in the future.
Because the court limits the jury’s assessment only to evidence of
the capital defendant’s prior history and offense, effectively every
risk assessment could conclude that the defendant would pose a
future danger to society. All capital defendants have committed
heinous crimes. When considering evidence of background,
character, record, and the prosecution’s subjective “expert”
testimony, it would seem that every capital defendant possesses
characteristics tending to show that he is a person of violent
character.201 Thus, the court’s interpretation of Virginia’s death
penalty statute does not pass constitutional muster because the
sentencing factor could reasonably apply to every convicted
murderer.202
This leads to the standardless sentencing discretion that the
Court has deemed intolerable under the Constitution. The
redefined aggravating factor does not “channel the jury’s
discretion by clear and objective standards that provide specific
and detailed guidance, and that make rationally reviewable the

199. Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 471 (1993).
200. See supra notes 23–33 and accompanying text (discussing Jurek v.
Texas and the Supreme Court’s approval of the future dangerousness
aggravating factor).
201. See Cunningham, supra note 51, at 834 (“[U]nder what circumstances
would a recently convicted . . . capital offender not be considered dangerous,
compared with a law-abiding member of the community?”).
202. See Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428–29 (1980) (striking down as
unconstitutional one of Georgia’s statutory aggravating factors because “[a]
person of ordinary sensibility could fairly characterize almost every murder as
‘outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman’”).
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process for imposing a sentence of death.”203 It now irrationally
departs from the commonsense understanding that the
aggravating factor directs the jury to undertake a predictive
inquiry about the defendant’s likelihood to commit additional
violent crimes if allowed to live204 and instructs the jury to
perform some arbitrary assessment of the defendant’s character.
Absent further guidance, a juror of ordinary sensibility could
reasonably characterize any capital defendant to be a person of
dangerous character. This “standardless and unchanneled
imposition of death sentences in the uncontrolled discretion of a
basically uninstructed jury” violates the Eighth Amendment.205
2. The Redefined Statute Violates the Eighth Amendment’s
Mandate that the Defendant Has the Right to Present All
Mitigating Evidence
Not only does the redefined future dangerousness
aggravating factor violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition
against the arbitrary implementation of the death penalty, it also
violates the defendant’s right to present all relevant mitigating
evidence. The Supreme Court held in Lockett v. Ohio206 that,
pursuant to the Eighth Amendment, the jury must “not be
precluded from considering, as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a
defendant’s character or record and any of the circumstances of
the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence
less than death.”207 The Court later stated that “evidence that the
defendant would not pose a danger if spared (but incarcerated)
must be considered potentially mitigating.”208 “[A] defendant’s
disposition to make a well-behaved and peaceful adjustment to
203. Id. at 427 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
204. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274 (1976) (stating that in conducting
a future dangerousness analysis, the jury is instructed to “predict future
behavior”).
205. Godfrey, 446 U.S. at 429.
206. Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
207. Id. at 604.
208. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 (1986); see also id. at 7 n.2
(“Such evidence of adjustability to life in prison unquestionably goes to a feature
of the defendant’s character that is highly relevant to a jury’s sentencing
determination.”).
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life in prison is itself an aspect of his character that is by its
nature relevant to the sentencing determination.”209 The
Supreme Court of Virginia’s preclusion of base rate-focused risk
assessment evidence, which specifically takes into account a
defendant’s ability to adapt to prison life, violates these
fundamental constitutional standards.
Individualized risk assessments, like the one that the
defendant proffered in Lawlor, are based on characteristics such
as the defendant’s age, employment history, and ongoing
connections with family and friends.210 Such evidence, which
serves the “explicit purpose of convincing the jury that [the
defendant] should be spared the death penalty because he would
pose no undue danger to his jailers or fellow prisoners and could
lead a useful life behind bars if sentenced to life imprisonment,”
is powerful mitigation evidence because it tends to make jurors
less likely to impose death. 211 It demonstrates to the jury that a
life sentence, rather than a death sentence, is appropriate. Risk
assessment evidence demonstrating that the defendant would
pose a low risk of violence in the prison environment is exactly
what the Court has held cannot constitutionally be excluded as
mitigating evidence.
The preceding discussion argues that the Supreme Court of
Virginia’s redefinition of the Commonwealth’s future
dangerousness aggravating factor runs afoul of the Eighth
Amendment. The court’s reinterpretation of the aggravating
factor cannot stand in light of the Constitution’s ban on cruel and
unusual punishment. The argument may be made, however, that
Lawlor did not in fact redefine the aggravating factor. Although it
is difficult to defend this argument,212 the next section addresses
the constitutional deficiencies in Virginia’s future dangerousness
statutory aggravating factor if the court’s decision in Lawlor is
interpreted in this alternative manner.
209. Id. at 7 (emphasis added).
210. See Opening Brief for Appellant, supra note 3, at 48 (“Dr.
Cunningham’s opinions . . . did not constitute evidence of what a person may
expect in the penal system[,] . . . but concern[ed] the history or experience of the
defendant, . . . reflecting Mr. Lawlor’s specific characteristics . . . .”).
211. Skipper, 476 U.S. at 7.
212. See supra notes 168–79 and accompanying text (discussing Lawlor’s
impact on Virginia’s future dangerousness statutory aggravating factor).
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C. An Alternative Reading of Lawlor
Notwithstanding the foregoing argument that Lawlor
effectively redefines Virginia’s statutory aggravating factor to
require the jury to perform a character assessment rather than a
risk assessment, one might assert that the court’s decision does
not inevitably redefine the aggravating circumstance to require a
character assessment. If Lawlor is read to require Virginia juries
to make a forward-looking assessment to predict a capital
defendant’s likely future behavior, the aggravating factor is
nevertheless unconstitutional. This is because the capital
defendant’s constitutional right to rebut the Commonwealth’s
future dangerousness claim is unquestionably violated.
The U.S. Supreme Court’s capital decisions have long
presumed that claims of future dangerousness will be subjected
to thorough adversarial testing.213 This is because the Due
Process Clause requires that the defendant be allowed to rebut
all accusations by the prosecution.214 The Supreme Court of
Virginia’s holding in Lawlor runs afoul of this constitutional
mandate by prohibiting a vital tool in the defense’s rebuttal
argument, and for all practical purposes, it renders the
prosecution’s claim of future dangerousness a nearly
unrebuttable assertion.
The Supreme Court of Virginia’s interpretation of the “future
dangerousness” statutory aggravating factor denies the Virginia
capital defendant the constitutionally required opportunity to
“present his own side of the case.”215 The capital defendant is
prohibited from presenting the strongest argument concerning
why he is unlikely to commit serious violent acts in the future—
namely, the commonsense understanding that “preventative
213. See, e.g., Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 901 (1983) (“We are
unconvinced . . . that the adversary process cannot be trusted to sort out the
reliable from the unreliable evidence and opinion about future dangerousness,
particularly when the convicted felon has the opportunity to present his own
side of the case.”).
214. See Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 5 n.1 (1986) (“Where the
prosecution specifically relies on a prediction of future dangerousness in asking
for the death penalty, . . . elemental due process require[s] that a defendant not
be sentenced to death ‘on the basis of information which he had no opportunity
to deny or explain.’” (quoting Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977))).
215. Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 901.
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measures such as lock down, isolation, and shackled movement
reduce and counter the opportunity for violence toward others.”216
A capital defendant is left to present only backwards-looking
evidence. Because the defendant is a convicted capital murderer,
who undoubtedly committed a gruesome crime, there is no
reasonable way he can effectively argue that he will not pose a
danger to society in the future with such a limited range of
evidence. In essence, the defendant is “not permitted the means
to effectively respond to the Commonwealth’s assertions” that he
would likely commit violent acts in the future if allowed to live
out his life in prison.217 If Lawlor is read to require a forwardlooking assessment, it is clear that Virginia law now bases a
death penalty sentence on unsubstantiated speculation about the
defendant’s likely behavior in society,218 after an imaginary
release from prison which is legally certain never to happen,219
while prohibiting the defendant from presenting his strongest
rebuttal argument.
The Supreme Court of Virginia’s exclusion of base ratefocused evidence is in tension with the U.S. Supreme Court’s
decision in Simmons v. South Carolina, which involved the due
process right to rebut the prosecution’s claims of future
dangerousness.220 The Court in Simmons held that capital
defendants have a due process right to rebut prosecution claims
of future dangerousness by informing juries that their “life
imprisonment” sentencing option carries with it no chance of
parole.221 This “life without parole” evidence has nothing to do
216. Tanner, supra note 38, at 385.
217. Morva v. Commonwealth, 683 S.E.2d 553, 569 (Va. 2009) (Koontz, J.,
dissenting).
218. See supra notes 59–74 and accompanying text (discussing the counterintuitive reality that the actual rate of serious violence by imprisoned
murderers is far lower than the “continuing threat” predictions of misinformed
sentencing jurors).
219. See supra notes 90–93 and accompanying text (discussing abolition of
parole in Virginia).
220. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 165 (1994) (“Like the
defendants in Skipper and Gardner, petitioner was prevented from rebutting
information that the sentencing authority considered, and upon which it may
have relied, in imposing the sentence of death.”).
221. See id. at 171 (“The State may not create a false dilemma by advancing
generalized arguments regarding the defendant’s future dangerousness while,
at the same time, preventing the jury from learning that the defendant never
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with a defendant’s past record, history, or offense, and yet the
Supreme Court determined that it was appropriate and critical
evidence to rebut the prosecution’s future dangerousness claim.222
The Simmons decision demonstrates that, despite what the
Supreme Court of Virginia has mistakenly held, merely because
evidence is generally applicable to all inmates does not
automatically disqualify it from consideration as rebuttal
evidence. Because the relevant inquiry is constitutional in nature
rather than statutory, evidence that does not necessarily pertain
to a defendant’s past record, history, or offense may nonetheless
be constitutionally required. Risk assessment evidence is
precisely that type of constitutionally mandated evidence.
Accordingly, even if the Supreme Court of Virginia’s decision
in Lawlor requires a forward-looking risk assessment in
determining a capital defendant’s future dangerousness, the
aggravating circumstance cannot withstand constitutional
scrutiny. Either way it is interpreted, it is undoubtedly time for a
critical reassessment of the Commonwealth’s understanding of
“future dangerousness.”
VI. Conclusion
Death is different.223 Because of its finality, any death
penalty scheme deserves increased precautions to ensure that it
is not imposed speciously. Despite this reality, Virginia law
places a defendant’s future dangerousness at the center of its
capital sentencing process but does little to guarantee its fair
implementation. The Supreme Court of Virginia’s latest decision
will be released on parole.”).
222. See id. at 165 (“The logic and effectiveness of [the defendant’s]
argument naturally depended on the fact that he was legally ineligible for
parole and thus would remain in prison if afforded a life sentence.”).
223. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976)
[T]he penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of
imprisonment, however long. Death, in its finality, differs more from
life imprisonment than a 100-year prison term differs from one of
only a year or two. Because of that qualitative difference, there is a
corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific
case.
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in Lawlor solidifies once and for all the fundamental unfairness
of the Commonwealth’s capital sentencing scheme.
The Supreme Court of Virginia’s long and convoluted course
to its current interpretation of Virginia’s future dangerousness
statutory aggravating factor has ended in a construal of the
aggravating factor that runs afoul of essential constitutional
standards. A future dangerousness inquiry under Virginia’s
capital sentencing scheme now requires a jury to base its future
dangerousness assessment not on a prediction of a defendant’s
likely future behavior but instead on some amorphous facet of the
defendant’s character.224 By banning modern risk assessment
methodology in Virginia capital proceedings and allowing
unscientific and unreliable evidence in its stead, capital juries are
left to make unfettered determinations as to which capital
defendants live and which capital defendants die. Such
unrestrained infliction of the death penalty is a clear violation of
the Supreme Court’s long-established rule that a sentence of
death may not be imposed under sentencing procedures that
create a substantial risk that the punishment will be inflicted in
an arbitrary and capricious manner.225
Virginia’s steadfast fixation with the death penalty has led it
to issue its most far-reaching decision to date. Not only does
Lawlor go well beyond any other jurisdiction,226 it offends
constitutional standards on multiple fronts. Critical changes are
needed to the Commonwealth’s capital sentencing structure. A
future dangerousness inquiry should not involve a nebulous
evaluation of the capital defendant’s character—it should entail a
prediction into the defendant’s likely future behavior based on
empirical, reliable risk assessment evidence. The Virginia
sentencing process should allow capital defendants to provide a
jury with an accurate understanding of life without parole and
224. See supra notes 176–79 and accompanying text (discussing the
Supreme Court of Virginia’s redefinition of the aggravating factor).
225. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 189 (1976) (“[W]here discretion is
afforded a sentencing body on a matter so grave as the determination of whether
a human life should be taken or spared, that discretion must be suitably
directed and limited so as to minimize the risk of wholly arbitrary and
capricious action.”).
226. See supra notes 183–93 and accompanying text (discussing the
difference between Virginia’s interpretation of future dangerousness and other
jurisdictions’ interpretations).
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should not leave jurors to speculate about possibilities. Unless
Virginia corrects its interpretation of its future dangerousness
statutory aggravating factor, the current capital sentencing
scheme runs too great a risk that the death penalty will be
applied “sparsely, selectively, and spottily to unpopular
groups.”227

227.

Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 256 (1972) (Douglas, J., concurring).

